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I.

INTRODUCTION

Society is becoming increasingly aware of the health risks posed
by many of the instrumentalities of modern living.' In this context,
the legal system must decide whether an individual faced with an
1. The literature is replete with information concerning the increased risks of disease
stemming from many modern activities. These risks exist whether one is at work, at home, or
at play. A few examples will illustrate this point. Newsweek recently published an article
warning of the health risks posed by the use of pesticides on fruit and vegetables and giving
practical advice on how to minimize those health risks. Begley, Hager & Howard, Dangers in
the Vegetable Patch, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 30, 1989, at 74, 74-75. The National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) recently reported that welders are at a significantly
increased risk of contracting lung cancer than the general population. NIOSH, CriteriaFor a
Recommended Standard. Welding Brazing, and Thermal Cutting, 1988 NAT'L INST.
OCCUPATIONAL

SAFETY

&

HEALTH

No. 88-110.

In addition, numerous studies are

suggesting a link between cancer and the extremely low frequency fields emitted by electrical
power lines. Slesin, Power Lines and Cancer: The Evidence Grows, 90 TECH. REV., Oct. 1987,
at 53. Even moderate alcohol consumption-as few as three drinks of beer or wine a week-is
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increased risk of harm resulting from another's tortious conduct 2 may
recover damages for that increased risk.3 In the absence of a present,
measurable physical injury, courts are very reluctant to recognize a
cause of action when a victim of toxic exposure seeks damages for an
increased risk of disease.4 If, however, the enhanced risk is associated
with an emotional injury or with a medically recognized need for periodic health checkups, many courts are willing to grant relief.5 Generassociated with an increased risk of breast cancer in women. Longnercker, A Meta-Analysis of
Alcohol Consumption in Relation to Risk of Breast Cancer, 260 J. A.M.A. 652 (1988).
2. This Comment assumes without discussion that the victim will be able to establish that
the wrongdoer was under a tort duty to the victim (whether in strict liability, negligence, or
nuisance), that the wrongdoer breached that duty, and that the breach resulted in the victim's
exposure to a toxic agent.
3. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (claim by
residents living near a waste dump for increased risks of cancer and liver and kidney disease
stemming from exposure to toxic agents that had leached into their well water); Burns v.
Jaquays Mining Corp., 156 Ariz. 375, 752 P.2d 28 (Ct. App. 1988) (suit by trailer park
residents for increased risks of asbestos-related diseases arising out of exposure to asbestos
waste improperly dumped at an adjacent landfill); Minnesota ex rel. Woyke v. Tonka Corp.,
420 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (claim by a factory worker for increased risk of cancer
due to his exposure to trichloroethylene (TCE), which had been improperly disposed of on his
land); Mauro v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 225 N.J. Super. 196, 542 A.2d 16 (App. Div.)
(action by an asbestos worker for an increased risk of contracting cancer as a result of repeated
exposure to the manufacturer's asbestos-containing products), cert. granted, 113 N.J. 341, 550
A.2d 455 (1988); Lavelle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 30 Ohio Misc. 2d 11, 507 N.E.2d
476 (C.P. Cayahoga County 1987) (action by an asbestos worker suffering from asbestosis for
an increased risk of contracting malignant mesothelioma or other asbestos-induced cancer);
Sorenson v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 51 Wash. App. 954, 756 P.2d 740 (Ct. App. 1988) (action by
shipyard worker for an increased risk of contracting lung cancer and mesothelioma stemming
from exposure to asbestos).
4. See, e.g., Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir.) (Railroad
workers' actions had not accrued before the consummation date of the railroad company's
bankruptcy reorganization because subclinical injury resulting from exposure to asbestos is
insufficient to constitute the identifiable, actual loss or damage to the workers' interests
required to sustain a cause of action.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985); Laswell v. Brown, 683
F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1982) (dismissing claim by children of an individual who died of cancer
after being exposed to low-level, ionizing radiation because allegations of genetically
transmitted cellular damage and exposure to an unusually high risk of disease cannot support a
lawsuit for present injuries), cert. denied sub nom. Laswell v. Weinberger, 459 U.S. 1210
(1983); Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 76 Ill. App. 3d 753, 756, 759-61, 394 N.E.2d 1369, 1372,
1374-76 (App. Ct. 1979) (The daughters of women who had taken Diethylstilbestrol (DES)
during pregnancy were unable to maintain a class action because allegations of exposure to
DES in utero and the existence of latent disease are an insufficient basis upon which to
recognize a present injury.).
5. The cause of action for increased risk of future disease must be distinguished from
causes of action for fear of future disease and for medical surveillance to detect future disease.
The action for fear of future disease requires the victim to show that he reasonably is in fear of
contracting the disease in the future, as a result of any increased risk of suffering the disease
engendered by the toxic exposure. See, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d
315, 317-19, modified en banc, 797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986). See generally Annotation, Future
Disease or Condition, or Anxiety Relating Thereto, as Element of Recovery, 50 A.L.R. 4th 13
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ally, a claim for enhanced risk of future disease will succeed only if
the victim can prove he has suffered a present physical injury and the
future disease is reasonably certain or reasonably probable to occur.'
In light of the current inchoate understanding of the etiology of can(1986). The action for medical surveillance to detect future disease, although not clearly
defined, seems to require the victim to show that, as a result of any increased risk of disease
caused by the toxic exposure, a physician reasonably could prescribe periodic medical
surveillance to ensure early detection and treatment of the disease. See, e.g., Burns v. Jaquays
Mining Corp., 156 Ariz. 375, 380-81, 752 P.2d 31, 33-34 (Ct. App. 1988); Ayers v. Township
of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 599-607, 525 A.2d 287, 308-13 (1987). In contrast, the action for
increased risk of future disease, in the majority of jurisdictions where it is recognized, requires
the victim to demonstrate that the increased risk of disease is such that the disease is
reasonably certain or reasonably probable to occur. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying
text.
6. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (interpreting
Tennessee law) (potential future disease not compensable unless reasonably certain to occur);
Deleski v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 819 F.2d 377, 380 (3d Cir. 1987) (both Pennsylvania and New
Jersey law require present physical manifestation of illness before enhanced risk of disease is
compensable); Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 783 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1986)
(interpreting Louisiana law) (excluding evidence of potential cancer absent any showing that
the risk of cancer had increased); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th
Cir.) (interpreting Mississippi law) (allowing recovery for a greater than fifty-percent chance of
future cancer because plaintiff had a present injury), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); Gideon
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985) (interpreting Texas law)
(permitting recovery for future cancer because plaintiff had a present injury); Brafford v.
Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14 (D. Colo. 1984) (interpreting Colorado law) (factual
allegations of cellular and subcellular damage satisfied the present injury requirement for an
increased risk of cancer claim); Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 156 Ariz. 375, 752 P.2d 31
(Ct. App. 1988) (present, physical symptomatic injury necessary for recovery); Morrissy v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 76 Ill. App. 3d 753, 394 N.E.2d 1369 (App. Ct. 1979) (potential future damages
not compensable unless reasonably certain to occur); Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296
Md. 656, 464 A.2d 1020 (1983) (damages may be recovered for a reasonable probability of
acquiring cancer); Minnesota ex rel. Woyke v. Tonka Corp., 420 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988) (requiring present physical injury as a prerequisite to recovery for a prospective cancer);
Lorenc v. Chemirad Corp., 37 N.J. 56, 179 A.2d 401 (1962) (allowing recovery for a
probability of cancer arising out of a chemical burn).
Some states have yet to address the issue of whether a victim exposed to a toxic agent can
bring a claim for increased risk of future disease. See, e.g., Brusher v. Alternate Energy
Resources, Inc., No. 86-RCCV-792 (Ga. Super. Ct.) (motion to dismiss pending), noted in 3
Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 169 (July 6, 1988). One isolated case apparently takes the extreme
position that a victim cannot bring a claim for increased risk of future disease, even though he
has a present physical injury and a greater than fifty-percent chance of contracting the disease.
Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), review denied, 492 So. 2d
1331 (Fla. 1986).
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cer 7 and other insidious diseases,8 the cause of action for increased
risk, as defined today, is nothing but a phantom remedy.
American courts are struggling to accommodate common law
tort doctrines to the peculiar characteristics of toxic substance litigation. There is considerable debate among those involved in the dayto-day operation of the existing tort liability and litigation system
about whether the present system is capable of dealing with personal
injuries resulting from industrial processes and products. 9 An evaluation of present approaches to the problem of increased risk of future
disease reveals that this accommodation is failing. '0 In large part, the
7. Dr. Joe W. Grisham, professor of pathology at the University of North Carolina
School of Medicine, explained that, although the etiology of cancer is still unknown, theories
of the viral and chemical origins of cancer are beginning to converge. Symposium, Scientific
Trends and Policy Formation in Human Toxic Risk Assessment (Sept. 19, 1988) (at Stanford
University), noted in 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 597-98 (Oct. 5, 1988). Researchers widely
recognize three stages of cancer: initiation, promotion, and progression. Id. Moreover, there
is growing evidence of a genetic component in the development of the disease, whether it stems
from a viral or a chemical cause. Id. See also OSHA, Identification, Classification and
Regulation of Potential Occupational Carcinogens, 29 C.F.R. § 1990.111 (1987) ("[T]he
conclusive identification of 'carcinogens' is a complex matter 'on the frontiers of science
....

' ,,).

The recent case of Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987),
highlighted the lack of understanding of the causative mechanisms of cancer. In Ayers,
residents brought an action against their city pursuant to the New Jersey Tort Claims Act,
claiming damages for increased risk of cancer arising out of the contamination of their well
water by toxic agents from the city's landfill. Id.at 565-66, 525 A.2d at 291. The residents'
expert toxicologist analogized the effect of exposure to carcinogens to a switch that, once
turned on, affects genetic material and may or may not lead to cancer: "We don't understand
scientifically yet the real biological steps throughout the whole chain, how exposure today to
some agent initiates or starts a process which in 20, 30 years from now ultimately manifests
itself or is seen as a cancer in an individual." Id. at 589 n.8, 525 A.2d at 303 n.8. See generally
McElveen & Eddy, Cancer and Toxic Substances. The Problem of Causationand the Use of
Epidemiology, PERS. INJ. DESKBOOK 198, 201-07 (1985) (discussing prevalent theories of
cancer etiology) [hereinafter McElveen].
8. Insidious diseases are carcinogenic, mutagenic, or teratogenic conditions. W.
LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK: SCIENCE AND THE DETERMINATION OF SAFETY 26-27
(1976). A carcinogen is any cancer-producing substance. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY
223 (24th ed. 1982) [hereinafter STEDMAN'S]. A mutagen is any agent that causes the
production of a mutation. Id.at 912. A teratogen is any drug or agent that causes abnormal
development. Id. at 1418. The word insidious denotes a disease that progresses with few or no
symptoms to indicate its gravity. Id. at 714.
9. At the 1987 proceedings of The American Law Institute, Judge Gerald T.
Wetherington emphasized that considerable disagreement has been generated concerning
whether " 'the existing tort liability and litigation system for [handling enterprise personal
injuries] is unduly costly and contentious; distributes compensation in an erratic and
inconsistent fashion; and has contributed to the unavailability of affordable liability insurance
and to the withdrawal of socially valuable products and services from the market.' " 64 A.L.I.
PROC. 70 (1987) (quoting the PROGRESS REPORT ON COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY FOR
PRODUCT AND PROCESS INJURIES 1 (1987)).
10. Commentators who have evaluated how well common law tort doctrines have been
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problem has been how to adapt traditional tort rules to toxic exposure

cases--cases involving fact scenarios that were wholly unforeseen
when these rules were originally formulated.II The courts' most frequent adaptation of these traditional rules has been to allow a toxic
exposure victim to split his cause of action and to postpone legal
action on his future disease claim 12until the risk of future disease
manifests itself as an actual disease.
adapted to toxic substance litigation overwhelmingly conclude that the courts have failed.
Ayers, 106 N.J. at 581, 525 A.2d at 299; see also Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law Liabilityfor
Toxic Torts." A Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 920-28 (1981) [hereinafter
Ginsberg & Weiss]. A number of government bodies and numerous commentators have
recommended that statutory compensation schemes be established to redress injuries sustained
by chemical exposure victims. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON ENVTL. & PUB. WORKS, 97TH
CONG., 2D SESS., INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES-ANALYSIS AND
IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES 178-257 (Comm. Print 1982) (Superfund Section 301(e)
Study Group) (recommending a two-tier system of remedies: a federal no-fault administrative
compensation scheme for exposure victims buttressed by modified state tort remedies);
Ginsberg & Weiss, supra, at 928-40; Trauberman, Statutory Reform of Toxic Torts: Relieving
Legal, Scientific and Economic Burdens on the Chemical Exposure Victim, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 177, 237-49 (1983) [hereinafter Trauberman]; Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional
Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim
Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REv. 575, 612-16 (1983) [hereinafter Pollution Victim
Compensation];see also Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A Public
Law Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851, 905-24 (1984) (proposing that courts
adopt "public law" measures such as class actions, damage scheduling, and insurance fund
judgments to ameliorate the tort system's ability to process mass exposure cases) [hereinafter
Rosenberg].
11. The inapplicability of traditional rules to toxic exposure cases is illustrated by
Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 3d 316, 164 Cal. Rptr. 591 (Ct.
App. 1980). In Martinez-Ferrer,the victim suffered retinal swelling after ingesting the anticholesterol drug MER/29 in 1960. Id. at 319, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 592. Sixteen years later, in
1976, the victim developed cataracts. Id. His doctor concluded that the cataracts had been
caused by the earlier ingestion of MER/29. Id. The victim immediately filed suit against the
manufacturer of MER/29 claiming damages for the cataract injury. Id. at 320, 164 Cal. Rptr.
at 593. The trial court held the action statute-barred on the ground that the single cause of
action rule mandated that the victim bring but one action against the manufacturer for all past,
present, and prospective harm. Id. The trial court concluded that this cause of action accrued
in 1960, when the ingestion of MER/29 resulted in retinal swelling, and became statute-barred
one year later. Id. This approach required the victim, in 1960, to foresee his chances of
developing cataracts in 1976. The California Court of Appeal reversed, declaring: "The
simple fact is that rules developed against the relatively unsophisticated backdrops of barroom
brawls, intersection collisions and slips and falls lose some of their relevance in these days of
miracle drugs with their wondrous, unintended, unanticipated and frequently long-delayed
side effects." Id. at 324, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 595.
12. See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119-20 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(interpreting District of Columbia law); Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 156 Ariz. 375, 752
P.2d 28, 31 (Ct. App. 1988); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 584, 525 A.2d 289,
300 (1987). In Ayers, the New Jersey Supreme Court succinctly described the adaptation of
the single cause of action rule:
[W~e concur with the principle that ... neither the statute of limitations nor the
single controversy rule should bar timely causes of action in toxic-tort cases
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Such tinkering with traditional tort rules is not a viable alternative to the outright acceptance of an immediate cause of action for a
medically proven increased risk of future disease. Contrary to the
assertion of some courts,13 the tort goals of deterrence and fair compensation, evidentiary considerations regarding proof of causation,
and public policy concerns for judicial economy are not advanced by
the current judicial approaches to claims of increased risk of future
disease.
This Comment addresses the pressing need to provide victims of
toxic exposure present, adequate remedies that, at the same time, further the basic goals of tort law. Section II describes current judicial
approaches to increased risk of future disease claims. Section III then
demonstrates how prevailing judicial attitudes effectively prevent
recovery for increased risk by toxic exposure victims. In addition,
Section IV explains how the courts, operating within the present tort
liability and litigation system, can recognize significantly increased
risk of future disease as a claim upon which relief can be granted.
This claim would be subject to a judicially imposed remedy of insurance coverage for the risk of future disease to which the victim has
been exposed. Finally, Section V concludes that in the light of the
inchoate understanding of the disease processes engendered by toxic
exposures, the insurance coverage remedy represents a better way to
handle increased risk of disease claims.
II.

CURRENT JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD INCREASED RISK
OF FUTURE DISEASE CLAIMS

A.

Three Problematic TraditionalRules

Three traditional rules have created particular difficulty for
courts that have addressed claims for increased risk of future disease:
the rule against splitting a cause of action, the rule of statutory limitation of tort actions, and the all-or-nothing rule of damages. Courts
have often disposed of these claims by referring to one or more of
instituted after discovery of a disease or injury related to tortious conduct,
although there has been prior litigation between the parties of different claims
based on the same tortious conduct.

Id.
13. See, e.g., Wilson, 684 F.2d at 118-20 (tort goal of fair compensation and evidentiary

concerns regarding causation advanced by current judicial approaches to increased risk
claims); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219,

1232 (D. Mass. 1986)

(interpreting Massachusetts law) (tort goal of fair compensation advanced by current judicial
approaches to increased risk claims); Eagle-Picher Indus. Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 521-26
(Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (tort goals of finality and judicial economy advanced by current judicial
approaches to increased risk claims), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986).
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these rules without careful consideration of whether application of the
rule is appropriate to this type of claim.
The rule against splitting a cause of action' 4 mandates that a victim may bring only one action for the recovery of all damages resulting from i single wrongful act, irrespective of whether such damages
are past, present, or prospective.' 5 Failure to include all related
claims against the wrongdoer in one action precludes the maintenance
of a second action based on unlitigated but related claims.' 6
The statutory limitation rule requires a victim to bring a tort
action to enforce his rights to compensation within a certain time, or
lose his right to enforce them. 17 The extent to which statutes of limitation pose procedural obstacles to toxic tort litigation varies widely,
depending upon the jurisdiction.' 8 If the limitation period is calculated from the moment of exposure, toxic exposure victims often discovertheir injury-and consequently their right to sue someone for
damages-after the limitation period has run because of the insidious
nature 9 of diseases engendered by toxic agents.2 ° Most jurisdictions
14. The rule is also known as the single controversy rule or the rule of merger. See, e.g.,
Martinez-Ferrer,105 Cal. App. 3d at 324 n.7, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 595 n.7; Ayers, 106 N.J. at 583,
525 A.2d at 300.
15. The purpose of the rule against claim-splitting is to ensure that a victim will not have
more than one opportunity to litigate the same matter. See Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp.,
586 F. Supp. 14, 18 (D. Colo. 1984) (interpreting Colorado law) (The single cause of action
rule is designed to ensure "plaintiff will not get a second bite of the apple.").
16. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states: "One injured by the tort of another is
entitled to recover damages from the other for all harm, past, present and prospective, legally
caused by the tort." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 910 (1977). Comment d states:
If an injured person fails to include in a suit all the elements of harm for which he
could have obtained damages and obtains a judgment based only upon some of
them, he is ordinarily not entitled to maintain a later action for the remaining
elements of harm, since his right is merged in the judgment.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 910 comment d (1977).
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments lists six exceptions to the rule against claimsplitting. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 (1976). Subsections 26(b) and 26(f)
are most relevant to toxic tort litigation. Id. §§ 26(b), 26(f). Under subsection 26(b), a second
action may be maintained if the plaintiff's right to do so has been expressly reserved in the first
action. Id. § 26(b). Under subsection 26(f), the plaintiff may bring a second action if he can
show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the policies favoring preclusion of a second action
are overcome for an extraordinary reason. Id. § 26(f).
17. The purpose of a statute of limitation is to encourage plaintiffs to act diligently upon
their rights and to protect defendants from claims based on events that have receded into the
past, or that have been fraudulently concocted. See Larson v. Johns-Manville Corp., 427
Mich. 301, 310-11, 399 N.W.2d 1, 5 (1986).
18. See Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 10, at 921 n.259; see also Note, Developments in the
Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1606-07 (1986) (discussing the
application of various state statutes of limitation to toxic-tort actions).
19. See supra note 8.
20. See, e.g., Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 1010-11, 430 N.E.2d
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have taken steps to remedy this unfairness by adopting one of several
variations of a "discovery" rule that tolls the limitation period until a
victim discovers the injury or should reasonably have discovered it.2'
"Discovery" rules, in turn, have created peculiarly difficult problems
for victims who have attempted to establish causation between a present injury and a tortious act that occurred many years earlier.
Under the all-or-nothing rule of damages,2 2 if the victim proves
his past, present, or prospective harm to the appropriate standard of
proof,23 that harm will be treated, for the purpose of valuation, as a
certainty. On the other hand, if the harm cannot be proved to the
appropriate standard of proof, it will be treated as nonexistent.
Hence, depending upon whether one can satisfy the standard of proof,
one recovers all or nothing.2 4
1297, 1298-99 (1981) (Asbestos workers' actions to recover damages for asbestosis filed more
than four years after their last exposure to asbestos dust were time-barred because the fouryear limitation period began to run at the time asbestos particles invaded the workers' lungs.).
21. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 582, 525 A.2d 289, 299 (1987). In 1986,
Congress preempted state statutes of limitation with a discovery rule whenever a victim is
exposed to "any hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the
environment from a facility." Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, § 309(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9658 (West Supp. 1988)). Within this
narrow factual context, the controlling commencement date for the running of state statutes of
limitation becomes the date the victim "knew (or reasonably should have known) that the
personal injury ... [was] caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or
contaminant concerned." Id. at § 309(b)(4)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9658(b)(4)(A)).
22. See C.T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 119 (1935);
McCormick, The Standard of Certainty in the Measure of Damages, 43 YALE L.J. 1108, 1128
(1934).
23. For a discussion of the standard of proof to which evidence of an increased risk of
future disease must conform, see infra notes 83-157 and accompanying text.
24. The potential unfairness of applying the all-or-nothing approach to claims for future
harm generally and to claims regarding insidious diseases in particular is well-documented.
See Cooper, Assessing Possibilitiesin Damage Awards-The Loss of a Chance or the Chance of a
Loss, 37 SASKATCHEWAN L. REV. 193, 215-25 (1973) [hereinafter Cooper] (examining the
unfairness of the American all-or-nothing approach to damages and advocating the adoption
of the English simple-probability approach); King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance in
PersonalInjury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J.
1353, 1376-87 (1981) (criticizing the all-or-nothing approach and proposing that losing a
chance to achieve a favorable outcome, such as avoiding death because of a physician's
misdiagnosis, or losing a chance to avoid an adverse consequence, such as avoiding future
blindness, should be compensable and that the amount of recovery should be valued by
reference to the percentage probability of the chance occurring); Rosenberg, supra note 10, at
862-66 (examining the economic inefficiency of all-or-nothing awards in toxic substance
litigation and suggesting that the solution lies in awarding a partial or proportional recoverynamely, total damages multiplied by the probability of causation).
To date, American courts have rejected the proportional recovery approach in the context
of claims for increased risk of future disease. See, e.g., Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785
F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986) (interpreting New Jersey law) (an asbestos worker subject to an
increased risk of cancer argued unsuccessfully that he should be allowed to recover damages
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B. Application of the Rules to Increased Risk Claims
The various ways in which courts have handled claims for
increased risk of future disease is best illustrated by a hypothetical. 25
The victim has worked for a number of years with products containing asbestos. Medical evidence indicates that his exposure to asbestos
has resulted in a present injury-thickening of the lung tissue. The
victim does not suffer presently from any cancerous condition. Epidemiological studies, however, indicate that he is in a category of asbestos workers who have a forty-three percent risk of developing lung
cancer due to their exposure to asbestos. The issue is as follows: At
what stage in the evolution of the victim's toxic injury should tort law
intercede by requiring the wrongdoer to compensate the victim?
At the outset, it must be stated that most courts allow recovery
when the toxic exposure victim can prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence: that he has suffered present physical injury; or that he has
suffered reasonable fear as a result of the increased risk of future disease; or that he must undergo periodic medical surveillance to detect
the onset of the possible future disease.2 6 Applied to the hypothetical,
the asbestos worker would be permitted to recover damages for the
equal to the amount he would have received had he contracted asbestos-related cancer,
reduced proportionately by the probability that he will not suffer the disease).
25. The case of Pollock v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 686 F. Supp. 489 (D.N.J. 1988),
provides the basis for the hypothetical used in the text. In Pollock, the asbestos manufacturers
moved to exclude from trial any medical testimony on the asbestos worker's claim for
increased risk of cancer. Id. at 489. In opposition to the motion, the asbestos worker
contended that he was prepared to adduce medical testimony to establish "that his risk of
cancer was: (1) caused by a diagnosed medical injury [thickening of lung tissue], and (2)
definable medically and scientifically as having a 43 percent statistical probability of occurring
in the future." Id. at 490. The district court excluded the medical testimony, ruling that a
quantified risk of cancer of only forty-three percent did not meet the standard of proofshowing the risk to be more probable than not. Id. at 492. Noting that thickening of lung
tissue is a separate and distinct disease process from cancer, and the extraordinary nature of
asbestos exposure litigation, the district court specifically recognized the asbestos worker's
"right to sue in the future should the increased risk created by the exposure to asbestos come
to fruition." Id. at 492 & n.4.
26. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (interpreting
Tennessee law) (landowners exposed to toxic agents in their well water entitled to recover
damages for kidney and liver damage, central nervous system injuries, emotional distress
arising from their 25-30% increased risk of cancer, and medical monitoring costs for the early
detection of any cancer); Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315 (interpreting
Louisiana law) (seaman drenched with toxic dripolene entitled to damages for his fear of
future cancer and for the reasonable cost of medical checkups for cancer), modified en banc,
797 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1986); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 289
(1987) (residents whose water supply was contaminated by chlorinated hydrocarbons leaching
from the town's landfill entitled to recover damages for emotional distress resulting from their
knowledge of having an unquantifiable increased risk of future diseases and for medical
surveillance for the early detection of such future diseases.)
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thickening of his lung tissue. Whether he could recover for fear of
cancer would depend on whether he had manifested reasonable fear
based on his forty-three percent enhanced risk of lung cancer. Similarly, whether he could recover medical surveillance costs would
depend on whether a physician reasonably could prescribe medical
monitoring for the early detection of cancer based on the forty-three
percent enhanced risk.
1.

STRICT APPLICATION OF THE SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION RULE

When faced with the scenario described in the hypothetical,
courts have adopted one of three solutions to the problem of increased
risk claims. 27 The first solution is to apply strictly the rule against
splitting a cause of action.2 8 This rule mandates that, once the tor-

tious conduct has resulted in the invasion of one of the victim's legally
protected interests and has produced a physical effect, then the victim's cause of action accrues, and he must bring an action within the
applicable statute of limitation period for all past, present, and prospective harm legally caused by the tortious conduct.29 If the victim
fails to make a claim for all the elements of harm for which he could
have obtained damages, and the court awards damages to him for
only some of those elements, then ordinarily he will be barred from
maintaining a later action for the remaining elements of harm.30
Governed by this rule, the asbestos worker in the hypothetical is
presented with an impossible dilemma.3 His cause of action accrues
when the exposure to asbestos fibers manifests itself as thickening of
27. See D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN & W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 26 (5th ed. Supp. 1988) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
28. See, e.g., Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1985) (interpreting Texas
law). In Dartez, an insulation worker, suffering no present physical effect from exposure to
asbestos, brought an action for fear of contracting cancer and increased risk of cancer. Id. at
460, 466. The insulator adduced evidence that from approximately 35% to 60% of insulators
diagnosed with asbestosis die from lung cancer and that his risk of cancer was only
approaching 50%. Id. at 466-67. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that the single cause of action rule required the insulator to bring one action for all
potential damages arising out of the tortious conduct, but ruled that he could not recover for
increased risk of cancer because he had failed to establish a reasonable medical probability of
future asbestos-related cancer. Id.
29. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
30. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
31. The plaintiff insulation worker in Dartez faced the dilemma of either trying to prove
his claim for increased risk of cancer at the time he had to claim for present physical injuries
and fear of cancer arising from his exposure to asbestos fibers or having the claim barred by the
single cause of action rule. The insulator's cause of action accrued when the inhalation of
asbestos fibers resulted in a fear of contracting cancer. 765 F.2d at 468. Yet the insulator was
unable to introduce sufficient evidence to establish the reasonable medical probability of future
asbestos-related cancer and consequently his increased risk went uncompensated. Id. at 466-
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the lungs. If he sues immediately, he will lose his claim for future
disease because a forty-three percent risk will not satisfy the appropriate standard of proof.32 If, however, he waits for the insidious disease
to become manifest, the statute of limitation will be running against
him and therefore eventually may bar his right of action.
2.

RELAXATION OF THE SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION RULE

A majority of courts have adopted a second solution to the problem of increased risk claims.33 Thse courts have held that the rule
against splitting a cause of action is simply inapplicable when the
same toxic exposure results in a present injury and a risk of future
injury, both of separate and distinct etiologies.34 Consequently, the
67. Were Dartez subsequently to contract an asbestos-related cancer, the single cause of action
rule would preclude any action against those responsible.
There are only three gambits a victim suffering from a 50% or lesser risk of future disease
may use to recover in a jurisdiction that adheres strictly to the single cause of action rule. He
may couch his claim in terms of a fear of future cancer, or a need for medical surveillance. See
supra note 5. Alternatively, he may phrase his claim in terms of a present injury-such as
pleural thickening-with a potential for further complications-for example, lung cancer. See
infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
32. For a discussion of the appropriate standard of proof to which prospective damages
must be established see infra notes 83-157 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 118-20 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(interpreting District of Columbia law); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219,
1231-32 (D. Mass. 1986) (interpreting Massachusetts law); Martinez-Ferrer v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 3d 316, 324-27 & n.7, 164 Cal. Rptr. 591, 595-97 & n.7 (Ct. App.
1980); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 521-26 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), review
denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986); Larson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 427 Mich. 301,
317-19, 399 N.W.2d 1, 8-9 (1986); Mauro v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 225 N.J. Super.
196, 203, 542 A.2d 16, 20 (App. Div.), cert. granted, 113 N.J. 341, 550 A.2d 455 (1988).
The policy reasons purportedly justifying two 'separate tort actions for toxic exposure
cases resulting in enhanced risks of insidious disease are that evidence regarding key issues in
an insidious disease case tends to develop rather than disappear as time passes, that the victim
should receive adequate compensation. but that the injurer should pay no more than what is
deemed adequate, and that victims should not be encouraged to file speculative anticipatory
lawsuits. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 118-20.
34. Despite the courts' verbal gymnastics, permitting an immediate action for present
injury and a future action should the insidious disease ever occur should be recognized for
what it is-a split cause of action. It is instructive to compare the case of Gideon v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985) (interpreting Texas law) with Devlin v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 556, 495 A.2d 495 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985). In
Gideon, an insulation warehouseman claimed damages for asbestosis and for a greater than
fifty-percent probability of sustaining malignant mesothelioma in the future, due to exposure to
asbestos fibers. 761 F.2d at 1138. In upholding Gideon's recovery, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declared that, once some injury occurs, in this case asbestosis, a
victim has one cause of action for all past, present, or prospective damage caused by the single,
legal wrong. Id. at 1136. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that "[ft]he cause of action 'inheres in
the causative aspects of a breach of a legal duty, the wrongful act itself, and not in the various
forms of harm which result therefrom.' " Id. at 1137 (quoting Annotation, Simultaneous
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toxic exposure victim has two independent tort actions-one for the
present injury and one that does not accrue until the latent disease
occurs. Although this solution attempts to minimize speculation as to
3
unpredictable future events, it does so at great cost to the tort goals
of deterrence and fair compensation.3 6 Applying the claim-splitting
approach to the above hypothetical results in the asbestos worker having an immediate right of action regarding the thickening of his lungs,
but having an inchoate right of action regarding the lung cancer,
which will mature once the cancer manifests itself.
3.

LIBERALIZATION OF THE STANDARDS

OF PROOF

The third solution to the problem of increased risk claims
involves the liberalization of standards of proof whenever the victim is
suffering from a present injury that has the potential for further complications. If the victim can demonstrate such a present injury, he
may recover damages for any substantial chance of future harm.3 7
Injury to Person and Property As Giving Rise to Single Cause of Action-Modern Cases, 24
A.L.R.4TH 646, 650 (1983)).
In Devlin, truck drivers brought suit based on their asbestosis, their unquantified risk of
dying from cancer, and their fear of contracting cancer. 202 N.J. Super. at 556-57, 495 A.2d at
495-96. The Superior Court of New Jersey held that, because asbestosis and asbestos-related
cancer are separate and distinct disease processes, an action for cancer would only accrue upon
its manifestation. Id. at 565, 495 A.2d at 500. The New Jersey court's distinction seems to
rest upon the difference between the " 'various forms of harm which result [from the wrongful
act itself.' " Gideon, 761 F.2d at 1137 (quoting 24 A.L.R.4TH 646, 650). The rule in Gideon,
however, implies that such a distinction constitutes unlawful claim-splitting. In contrast, the
Devlin court opined: -[T]he facts before this court do not truly implicate the entire
controversy doctrine." 202 N.J. Super. at 565, 495 A.2d at 502.
35. The major purposes of the law of torts are as follows:
(1) to provide a peaceful means for adjusting the rights of parties who might
otherwise 'take the law into their own hands'; (2) to deter wrongful conduct; (3)
to encourage socially responsible behavior; and, (4) to restore injured parties to
their original condition, insofar as the law can do this, by compensating them for
their injury.
W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1 (8th ed. 1988).
For a different perspective on the purpose of tort law, see RESEARCH STAFF OF THE ACADEMIC TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF THE INSURANCE AND TORT SYSTEMS, TORT REFORM

ALTERNATIVES 1, 4 (1987) (discussion draft-prepared for the Academic Task Force to assist
them in making recommendations to the Florida Legislature-urging that the tort system is
best understood as a conflict resolution system, meant to define the civil limits of harmful
behavior).
36. For a discussion of the reasons why the tort goals of deterrence and fair compensation
are not served by the split cause of action, see supra notes 184-96 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Starlings v. Ski Roundtop Corp., 493 F. Supp. 507, 510 (M.D. Pa. 1980)
(interpreting Pennsylvania law) (plaintiff recovered damages for a traumatic knee injury and
an increased risk of arthritis, even though plaintiff's doctors described the increased risk of
arthritis as an unquantified possibility); Feist v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 267 Or. 402, 412-13,
517 P.2d 675, 677, 680 (1973) (holding that physicians' testimony that there was a reasonable
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Underpinning this relaxed standard of proof regarding the extent of
the injury3 8 is the policy that it is unfair to deny a victim some recompense for increased risks when all the damages resulting from an
39
injury must be claimed in one cause of action.
. In order for the hypothetical asbestos worker4" to bring his
action within this third solution, he would have to prove, to a reasonable probability, that his exposure to asbestos fibers caused present
immunologic damage. A medical expert would have to testify as to
the existence and causation of such an injury to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty.4 ' It then could be argued that assessing the
increased risk of lung cancer is simply part of evaluating the extent of
the existing injury. Whether a court would accept such an analysis
would depend on the degree of medical understanding of how asbestos fibers render the lungs susceptible to cancer4 2 and the willingness
of the court to countenance a broad definition of present injury.4 3
medical probability that a child who was struck on the head by a falling cash register had an
increased susceptibility to meningitis was not speculative and provided a sufficient basis for a
jury finding of disability); Schwegel v. Goldberg, 209 Pa. Super. 280, 287-88, 228 A.2d 405,
409 (Super. Ct. 1967) (admitting testimony that the possibility of a head-injury victim
developing epileptic seizures was enhanced by the head-injury).
38. Before the relaxed standard of proof fc: the extent of the injury can be applied, the
victim must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that he suffered a presently ascertainable
injury as a result of the wrongdoer's tortious conduct. See Feist, 267 Or. at 407, 517 P.2d at
677; Schwegel, 209 Pa. Super. at 284, 228 A.2d at 409. The court is allowed to consider mere
possibilities only when assessing the extent of an existing disability. Feist, 267 Or. at 409-10,
517 P.2d at 678-79; Schwegel, 209 Pa. Super. at 287-88, 228 A.2d at 409.
39. See supra note 37. In Feist, the Supreme Court of Oregon declared it would be unfair
to hold the evidence of possible meningitis inadmissible, since an action for all damages arising
from the blow to the head had to be brought within the statutory limitations period. 267 Or. at
410, 517 P.2d at 678-79.
40. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
41. For an explanation of the proper meaning of an opinion expressed to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty, see infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
42. Exactly how asbestos fibers affect the body so as to create a cancer is not known. See
Lavelle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 30 Ohio Misc. 2d 11, 12 & n.4, 507 N.E.2d 476,
477 & n.4 (C.P. Cayahoga County 1987); see generally B. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL
AND LEGAL ASPECTS 39-122 (2d ed. 1986) (an excellent source of information about the
current understanding of the relationship between asbestos and cancer). Despite the
expenditure of billions of dollars on research, neither the causes of cancer in humans nor the
mechanisms by which cancer develops are known. Scientists do know, however, that
individuals exposed to certain substances appear to develop cancer more frequently than those
not exposed. McElveen, supra note 7, at 199, 206-07. The present state of knowledge
regarding cancer causation does not facilitate the sort of inquiry necessary to categorize a toxic
exposure injury as a present injury containing the potential for further complications.
43. To date, the extent of the injury rule has been applied only to gross physical injuries.
See Note, IncreasedRisk of Disease from Hazardous Waste: A ProposalForJudicial Relief, 60
WASH. L. REV. 635, 640 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Judicial Relief]; see, e.g., Starlings v. Ski
Roundtop Corp., 493 F. Supp. 507, 510 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (interpreting Pennsylvania law)
(traumatic knee injury resulting in enhanced risk of arthritis); McCall v. United States, 206 F.
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None of the three approaches adopted by American courts to
deal with increased risk of future disease claims have provided an
effective remedy for victims of toxic exposure. Traditional tort rules
have not worked well in the context of toxic substance litigation
because they were formulated in an age when nobody could foresee
the type and variety of insidious diseases to which society would be
exposed in the twentieth century. All three present approaches have
failed to solve the problems created by the inherently speculative
nature of the increased risk claim, while still advancing the dual tort
goals of fair compensation and deterrence.

III.

THE INADEQUACIES OF CURRENT JUDICIAL ATTITUDES
TOWARD INCREASED RISK OF FUTURE DISEASE CLAIMS

Neither those courts allowing a present action for the increased
risk of future disease nor those courts allowing the action to be postponed until the insidious disease becomes manifest have addressed the
option of allowing an action for an increased risk of future disease
and, when the action is successful, granting equitable relief narrowly
tailored to the nature of the claim." Yet many of the difficulties surrounding increased risk claims result from the relief presently availSupp. 421, 426 (E.D. Va. 1962) (interpreting Virginia law) (head-injury resulting in increased
risk of epilepsy); Feist v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 267 Or. 402, 410, 517 P.2d 675, 679 (1973)
(skull fracture resulting in increased susceptibility to meningitis); Schwegel v. Goldberg, 209
Pa. Super. 280, 283, 228 A.2d 405, 408 (Super. Ct. 1967) (skull fracture resulting in increased
susceptibility to meningitis). Attempts to transplant the rule to nontraumatic injuries have not
met with success. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 322 (W.D.
Tenn. 1986), rev'd, 855 F.2d 1188, 1204-05 (6th Cir. 1988) (interpreting Tennessee law)
(reversing district court's holding that a 25-30% enhanced susceptibility to disease established
to a reasonable degree of medical certainty was a present condition on the ground that the
victims failed to prove to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the disease would more
likely than not occur).
44. For a discussion of the nature of an appropriate equitable remedy, see infra notes 20414 and accompanying text. Every court addressing the issue of increased risk of disease has
discussed it in the context of the damages remedy. See, e.g., Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1204 ("While
it is unnecessary that the medical evidence conclusively establish with absolute certainty that
the future disease or condition will occur, mere conjecture or even possibility does not justify
the court awarding damages for a future disability which may never materialize."); Hagerty v.
L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 320 (5th Cir.) (interpreting Louisiana law) ("Even
when there is evidence that the increased risk of cancer exceeds fifty percent, the rule does not
work well. A plaintiff, if suffering any injury, is forced to seek cancer damages although the
extent of those damages is yet highly speculative."), modified en banc, 797 F.2d 256 (1986);
Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 597, 525 A.2d 287, 307 (1987) ("A holding that
recognizes a cause of action for unquantified enhanced risk claims ... imposes on judges and
juries the burden of assessing damages for the risk of potential disease, without clear guidelines
to determine what level of compensation may be appropriate.").
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able for such claims: all-or-nothing damages.45
A.

All-or-Nothing Damages and the Single Cause of Action Rule

In jurisdictions that strictly apply the single cause of action
rule,46 a toxic exposure victim is permitted to bring an action for an
increased risk of future disease. In order to recover on this action, the
victim must prove that the toxic exposure has caused a present physical injury and that the future disease will more likely than not occur
as a result of that toxic exposure." Once the occurrence of the future
disease is established to the appropriate standard of proof, the all-ornothing damages rule ensures that the increased risk claim is valued
48
as if the future disease were a certainty.
The propensity of the single cause of action rule and the all-ornothing damages rule to overcompensate or undercompensate
increased risk claimants has been well-documented.4 9 The case of
45. For a discussion of the meaning of the all-or-nothing damages rule, see supra notes 2224 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1985)
(interpreting Texas law).
47. See, e.g., Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1136-37 (5th Cir.
1985) (interpreting Texas law). In Gideon, the plaintiff, an insulation warehouseman who
handled asbestos products daily, brought an action against seventeen asbestos manufacturers
claiming damages for a present injury of asbestosis and for a significantly increased risk of
contracting mesothelioma or some other asbestos-related cancer. Id. at 1134. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied the rule that, once some injury results
from a single legal wrong, the victim's cause of action accrues, and he must seek damages for
all his injuries in one suit. Id. at 1136-37. In such a suit, a claim for future damages must be
proved by a preponderance of the evidence to be more likely to occur than not. Id. at 1137-38.
The court held that the plaintiff's cause of action accrued when asbestos fibers invaded his
lungs and resulted in pleural thickening, plaques, calcification, and asbestosis. Id. at 1137. In
addition, the court held that expert testimony, within reasonable medical probability, that the
plaintiff would die of an asbestos-related cancer and that he had a greater than fifty-percent
risk was sufficient to support a jury verdict for the plaintiff on the increased risk claim. Id. at
1137-38.
48. See Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(interpreting District of Columbia law); King, supra note 24, at 1363.
49. See, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 320 (5th Cir.)
(interpreting Louisiana law) (Even if the victim can adduce evidence of a greater than fiftypercent increased risk of cancer, he is still forced to seek cancer damages at a time when the
extent of those damages is highly speculative-the disease may never occur, it may be of
limited extent, or the suffering and expenses may be enormous.), modified en banc, 797 F.2d
256 (1986); Wilson, 684 F.2d at 120 & n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (interpreting District of Columbia
law) (The need to secure fair compensation for serious harm and thus the need to avoid
windfall recoveries and undercompensation weighs in favor of splitting the cause of action to
permit a later action for any asbestos-related cancer.); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481
So. 2d 517, 524 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (The speculation involved in predicting future damages
may lead to several inequitable results: the plaintiff who does not contract cancer may receive
a windfall, the unsuccessful plaintiff who subsequently develops cancer may have no relief, or
the successful plaintiff who later contracts cancer may have inadequate damages because, in
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Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,5 0 for example, illustrates this
trait very well. In Jackson, the plaintiff, a shipyard worker who
worked around asbestos dust for almost twenty years, developed
breathing problems, which were diagnosed as asbestosis.5 ' As a
result, he filed suit and claimed damages, inter alia, for a "susceptib[ility] to increased risks of infections and malignancies." 52 At trial,
three expert witnesses testified that, based on statistical risks adduced
from epidemiological studies53 and on the plaintiff's medical records,
the plaintiff had a greater than fifty-percent chance of contracting an
asbestos-related cancer in the future.5 4 In an en banc opinion, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, interpreting
Mississippi law, held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for the
future cancer because the testimony established that he probably
would contract cancer sometime in the future.55 The Fifth Circuit
strictly applied the rule against splitting a cause of action and determined that a single cause of action arose when the inhalation of asbestos fibers produced at least one physical effect, in this case
asbestosis.1 6
The inequity of this opinion is immediately apparent. 7 The
calculating the recovery, the jury took into account the chance that the plaintiff would not
contract cancer.), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986).
50. 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.) (interpreting Mississippi law), modified en bane, 750 F.2d 1314
(5th Cir. 1984), questions certified, 757 F.2d 614 (5th Cir.), cert. declined, 469 So. 2d 99 (Miss.
1985), aff'd en banc, 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
51. Id. at 509.
52. Id. at 510. The plaintiff also claimed damages for loss of energy and stamina, impaired
working ability, mental frustration, medical monitoring costs, and reduced life expectancy. Id.
53. Wong, Using Epidemiology to Determine Causation in Disease, 2 NAT. RESOURCES J.
20, 20 (1984). Wong defines epidemiology as "the study of distribution and determinants of
diseases. In other words, epidemiologists, based on properly designed studies, identify groups
with high rates of a disease (distribution) and determine what factors cause the higher rates
(determinants)." Id. The weight given to an epidemiological finding of a causal association
between exposure to a toxic agent and certain effects in human beings depends on a number of
factors: strength and significance of association, consistency of association, specificity,
temporality, dose-response relationship, and biological plausibility and coherence with existing
knowledge. Id. at 21-22, 49 (citing Hill, The Environment and Disease.- Association with
Causation? 58 PROC. ROYAL Soc'Y MED. 295 (1965)); see also Cornfeld & Minton, How to
Defend Against an Adverse EpidemiologicalStudy, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1092 (Feb. 8, 1989)
(discussing ten principles for analyzing and interpreting epidemiological studies); Rodricks,
The Problem of Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, I Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 923 (Jan. 28,
1987) (discussing the type of evidence used to prove causation in toxic tort litigation).
54. Jackson, 727 F.2d at 516.
55. Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 411-12 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
56. Id. at 412.

57. For a robust criticism of the result in Jackson, see Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs.,
Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 320-21 (5th Cir.) (interpreting Louisiana law) (applying the rule against
splitting a cause of action but at the same time subjecting it to trenchant criticism), modified en
banc, 797 F.2d 256 (1986).
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plaintiff was fully compensated for a future injury he may never suffer. In addition, all similarly situated shipyard workers with like
exposure to that of the plaintiff will be able to rely upon the same
epidemiological studies to establish a greater than fifty-percent likelihood of contracting an asbestos-related cancer, therefore establishing
a right to full compensation for cancer. Looked at another way, if one
assumes that the number of shipyard workers who fall into the risk
group identified by the epidemiological studies is 100, and the risk of
asbestos-related cancer can be quantified thereunder as fifty-one percent,5 8 then all 100 shipyard workers will be entitled to recover full
cancer damages, even though, if the statistics prove accurate, only
fifty-one actually will contract cancer. 9 The result is a glaring example of overdeterrence, ° resulting in unwarranted interference with the
58. Scientific studies of asbestos have resulted in atypically good estimates of the health
risks posed by asbestos to humans. See Elliott, The Future of Toxic Torts: Of Chemophobia,
Risk as a Compensable Injury and Hybrid Compensation Systems, 25 Hous. L. REV. 781, 78384 n. 10 (1988) [hereinafter Elliott]. Yet epidemiological studies of asbestos industry workers
rarely produce findings of a greater than fifty-percent risk. See generally WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, INT'L AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER,

OVERALL EVALUATIONS OF

IARC MONOGRAPHS ON THE EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC RISKS TO
HUMANS 106-09 (Supp. 7 1987) (reviewing data on the carcinogenicity of asbestos to humans)
CARCINOGENICITY,

[hereinafter

EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC RISKS TO HUMANS].

A clear association has been found between Diethylstilbestrol (DES), a drug used
extensively to prevent miscarriages in pregnant women, and adenocarcinoma, a rare disease
with a minimal incidence in the general population. See B. SEAMAN, WOMEN AND THE
CRISIS IN

SEX

HORMONES

29-30 (1977).

Statistical estimates of the incidence of

adenocarcinoma among the daughters of women who ingested DES while pregnant, however,
range only from 1 in 1,000 to 4 in 1,000. Id. at 29. Even if a "DES daughter" overcomes the
considerable barrier of demonstrating a present physical effect of DES-exposure, her claim will
founder on the unyielding rock of proof of a greater than fifty-percent chance that the cancer
will occur. See, e.g., McAdams v. Eli Lilly & Co., 638 F. Supp. 1173 (N.D. I11. 1986)
(interpreting Illinois law).
59. See generally Jose, Causation in Toxic Torts: Why Rulings in Many Cases are and Will
be Unfair, 1 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 92 (July 2, 1986) (discussing several alternative standards
of proof and the unfairness that will always result when proof is based upon epidemiological
studies).
60. In its "Spring 1988 Progress Report," Compensation and Liability for Product and
Process Injuries, the Council to the Members of The American Law Institute identified three
problems that undermine the effectiveness of the "second tier" of the tort system-that is, the
new areas of tort litigation created by enterprise liability, medical malpractice, and
environmental harms-in achieving the goals of compensation and appropriate deterrence.
A.L.I., Compensation and Liability for Product and Process Injuries: Spring 1988 Progress
Report 15-16 (April 15, 1988) (discussion draft) [hereinafter Spring 1988 ProgressReport]. The
three problems are high administrative costs, incentive malfunctions, and loss insurance
malfunctions. Id. Overdeterrence constitutes the main incentive malfunction of the system, in
that the imprecise tool of case-by-case litigation can result in overdeterrence of socially
productive activity, namely, the potential wrongdoer choosing not to invest in a particular
product or process because of the danger of vast liability against which it can take no
prophylactic measures. Id. at 4, 16. High administrative costs refer to the high cost of the tort
system-largely lawyers' fees-compared with other remedial mechanisms. Id. at 15. The

1098

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1081

economic health of businesses that generate income and jobs.
Yet another, more serious inequity arises out of the strict application of the single cause of action rule in Jackson. The opinion takes
no account of the victim's ability to prove the probable 6' future consequences of exposure to a toxic agent. Although on the facts there was
sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's finding that
Jackson would contract an asbestos-related cancer in the future,62 in
the context of most other toxic exposures, the probability standard
establishes an insuperable barrier to recovery for future diseases.63
Consequently, strict application of the single cause of action rule
encourages plaintiffs' attorneys to retain experts who are willing to
present an extreme interpretation of available scientific evidence in
order to ensure that a claim will reach the jury.64 Another potential
consequence is that juries will not comply with the harsh standard of
proof and therefore will render a verdict for the victim based on their
own sense of justice.65
An additional flaw in the Jackson opinion 66 is that the jury has
minimal information upon which to make an assessment of the full
problem of loss-insurance malfunctions embraces the system's poor performance in adequately
compensating victims. Id. at 15-16.
61. For a discussion of the meaning of the standard of probability to which future
consequences must be proved, see supra notes 83-157.
62. Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 411-13 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
63. Of reported cases involving a claim for increased risk of future disease stemming from
exposure to a toxic agent, only two, both involving occupational exposure to asbestos, had
appellate courts determine that the evidence presented satisfied the standard of proof for future
consequences. Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.) (interpreting
Mississippi law), modified en banc, 750 F.2d 1314 (1984), questions certified, 757 F.2d 614 (5th
Cir.), cert. declined, 469 So. 2d 99 (Miss. 1985), aff'd en banc, 781 F.2d 394, 411-13 (5th Cir.)
(A shipyard worker with asbestosis recovered damages for his increased risk of an asbestosrelated cancer when, based on epidemiological studies and his medical records, three expert
witnesses were able to testify that he had a greater than fifty-percent chance of acquiring such
a cancer in the future.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1136-37 (5th Cir. 1985) (interpreting Texas law) (expert testimony that,
in reasonable medical probability, plaintiff had a greater than fifty-percent risk of dying of an
asbestos-related cancer was held sufficient to support the jury verdict).
64. See Elliott, supra note 58, at 786-87.
65. Id. at 787. Professor Elliott argues that the traditional rule holding that it is unfair to
require a defendant to compensate a plaintiff for the plaintiff's losses unless the plaintiff proves
that the defendant more likely than not caused those losses, "no longer captures our society's
prevailing sense of justice in cases where innocent people have been involuntarily exposed to
substances that are potentially dangerous to their health." Id.
66. 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.) (interpreting Mississippi law), modified en banc, 750 F.2d 1314
(5th Cir. 1984), questions certified, 757 F.2d 614 (5th Cir.), cert. declined, 469 So. 2d 99 (Miss.
1985), aff'd en banc, 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
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value of the victim's future cancer. 67 A greater than fifty-percent
chance of an asbestos-related cancer occurring provides no informa-

tion about the particular cancer that is likely to develop. 6 Nor is
there any information as to when the disease will strike, what course
it will take, what future treatment may be available, and how much it
will cost. Yet such information is essential for a proper assessment of
compensatory damages for such losses as medical treatment costs,
pain and suffering, and diminished earning capacity.69 Allowing the
jury to evaluate such highly speculative matters undermines the tort
goal of making the victim whole7 0 and further destroys public confidence in the ability of the legal system to ensure justice.

By far the most serious consequence of the single cause of action
rule, as applied in Jackson, is that victims of toxic exposure will never
receive compensation for, and wrongdoers will never be deterred from

exposing people to, the long-term effects of toxic agents. This result
may be illustrated by the recent case of Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical
Corp.,71 in which residents living in the vicinity of a landfill brought a
class action suit to recover for personal injuries and property damage
arising out of the migration of chlorinated hydrocarbons from the
landfill owned by Velsicol.7 2 The five representative plaintiffs alleged
presently ascertainable injuries such as liver and kidney damage, eye
injuries, and numerous central nervous system injuries.73 In addition,

they brought claims demanding compensation for their fear and
increased risk of contracting cancer and other diseases in the future.7 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, applying
Tennessee law, reversed the trial court's award of damages for an
67. See supra note 49 (cases emphasizing the conjectural nature of the evidence in
increased risk claims).
68. Asbestos exposure has been associated with bronchial carcinoma, pleural and
peritoneal malignant mesotheliomas, and cancers of the larynx and gastrointestinal system
(esophagus, stomach, colon, and rectum). G. PETERS & B. PETERS, SOURCEBOOK ON
ASBESTOS DISEASES: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ENGINEERING ASPECTS B6-B9 (1980).
69. The speculative nature of the inquiry into the valuation of an increased risk claim must
be distinguished from the ever-present problem in personal injury actions of monetarizing the
victim's loss. All damage assessments in personal injury actions involve a component for what
will probably happen in the future. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES
286 (1973). The difference between the common or garden-variety personal injury case and
the claim for increased risk is that, in the former case, damages are awarded on the basis of
events that have occurred and from which experts can extrapolate future consequences. In
contrast, the injury evaluated in the latter case has not occurred and may never occur.
70. For a list of the primary goals of modern tort law, see supra note 35.
71. 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
72. Id. at 1192-94.
73. Id. at 1201-03.
74. Id. at 1204-05.

1100

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1081

increased susceptibility to cancer and other diseases ranging from
twenty-five to thirty percent.7" The Sixth Circuit held that the available evidence of future injury fell short of the greater-than-fifty-percent-chance standard established in Jackson and thus was
uncompensable.7 6

The significance of Sterling is that the proportion of local residents who subsequently succumb to cancer resulting from their invol-

untary exposure to Velsicol's chemicals will never be compensated.
Like Mississippi law, interpreted in Jackson,7 7 Tennessee law gener-

ally applies the single cause of action rule strictly.78 The victim recovers no compensation for those elements of future loss that he cannot
demonstrate to the appropriate standard of proof at the time the stat-

ute of limitation requires him to seek relief for presently ascertainable
injuries.7 9
Applying this rule to the facts of Sterling results in no specific
compensation for any resident who later succumbs to a chlorinated
hydrocarbon-related cancer. At the time the resident recovers damages for present injuries such as liver and kidney disease, he is unable
to prove the future toxin-induced cancer has a greater than fifty-percent chance of occurring. Defenses of statute of limitation and res
judicata would frustrate any attempt to pursue a second action for
this later manifested injury. Thus, in the context of toxic exposure
75. Id. at 1205.
76. Id.
77. 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.) (interpreting Mississippi law), modified en banc, 750 F.2d 1314
(5th Cir. 1984), questions certified, 757 F.2d 614 (5th Cir.), cert. declined, 469 So. 2d 99 (Miss.
1985), aff'd en banc, 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
78. See, e.g., National Cordova Corp. v. Memphis, 214 Tenn. 371, 380, 380 S.W.2d 793,
797 (1964) (" 'A single tort can be the foundation for but one claim for damages.... All
damages which can by any possibility result from a single tort form an indivisible cause of
action.' ") (quoting Johnston v. Southern Ry. Co., 155 Tenn. 639, 643, 299 S.W. 785, 786
(1927)).
79. Potts v. Celotex Corp., 703 F. Supp. 672, 675-76 (E.D. Tenn. 1988). In Potts, a
personal injury action was filed on behalf of an asbestos worker who had died of mesothelioma
within one year of the mesothelioma diagnosis. Id. at 672-74. The worker had been advised
that he had asbestosis thirteen years earlier. Id. at 672. The worker, however, chose not to sue
for his asbestosis at that time. Id. The defendant asbestos companies obtained summary
judgment based on a strict application of the single cause of action rule. Id.at 675-76. In
granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the district court held that Tennessee
law did not permit the one-year statute of limitation "to begin to run anew for each successive
injury caused by the same wrongful act." Id. at 674.
The effect of this opinion is to require victims to file an action for future consequences at
the time of their first exposure-related injury and to try to find a physician who will testify that,
to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the victim will suffer the future consequences.
Stated in the words of the court, "this 'single injury' rule may effectively preclude recovery for
serious asbestos-related injuries that develop many years after an initial hurt ...."Id. at 675-
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cases, strict application of the single cause of action rule results in
intolerable noncompensation of victims and consequent underdeterrence of wrongdoers.
Faced with the inherently speculative and conjectural nature of
valuing risks in the context of the traditional all-or-nothing approach
to damages, courts have attempted to minimize speculation by tinkering with the standard of proof, ° the requirement of present injury,"'
and the rule against splitting a cause of action. 2 Such tinkering has
80. See Rabb v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 677 F. Supp. 424, 426-27 (D.S.C. 1987)
(interpreting South Carolina law) (United States district court denied motion for a new trial by
homeowners exposed to termiticide because the homeowners failed to establish that they most
probably would contract any disease related to Chlordane or Heptachlor.); Stites v.
Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1516, 1523-26 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (interpreting
Michigan law) (District court granted manufacturing plant owner's summary judgment
motion because the local residents who were exposed to trichloroethylene ("TCE") were
unable to demonstrate the existence of facts supporting the reasonable certainty of the eventual
occurrence of the future cancer.); Larson v. Johns-Manville Corp., 427 Mich. 301, 317, 399
N.W.2d 1, 8 (1986) (Wrongful death actions to recover damages for asbestos-related cancers
brought by the personal representatives of the estates of insulation workers were permissible
when filed within three years of the date the workers discovered they had cancer, because at
the time the workers first developed asbestosis, they could not have shown a reasonably certain
future occurrence of asbestos-related cancers.); Lavelle v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 30
Ohio Misc. 2d 11, 13-14, 507 N.E.2d 476, 478-80 (C.P. Cayahoga County 1987) (granting
asbestos manufacturer's motion in limine prohibiting an asbestosis-afflicted plaintiff from
introducing at trial any evidence of his increased risk of cancer because evidence of the
possibility thai asbestosis might develop into cancer did not rise to the standard of reasonable
certainty). But see Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1201 (6th Cir. 1988). In
Sterling, the court stated:
Whereas numerous jurisdictions have rejected medical experts' conclusions based
upon a 'probability,' a 'likelihood,' and an opinion that something is 'more likely
than not' as insufficient medical proof, the Tennessee courts have adopted a far
less stringent standard of proof and have required only that the plaintiffs prove a
causal connection between their injuries and the defendant's tortious conduct by
a preponderance of the evidence.
Id.
81. See, e.g., Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261, 269 (8th Cir. 1982) (Children of a
serviceman, who had been exposed to low-level ionizing radiation during nuclear weapons
testing, failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted when they merely alleged that
they had been exposed to an "unusually high risk of disease in genetically passed cellular
damage."), cert. denied sub nom. Laswell v. Weinberger, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983); Burns v.
Jaquays Mining Corp., 156 Ariz. 375, 376-78, 752 P.2d 28, 29-31 (Ct. App. 1988) (Court
granted owner of an asbestos-producing mill summary judgment on a claim by local residents
for increased risk of cancer and other diseases because the only "injury" alleged to have been
suffered by the residents was exposure to asbestos fibers.); Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 76 Il.
App. 3d 753, 756, 759-61, 394 N.E.2d 1369, 1372, 1374-76 (App. Ct. 1979) (Daughters of
women who had ingested DES failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted for
increased risk of suffering future diseases because the possibility of developing cancer or other
injurious conditions as a consequence of exposure to DES in utero does not constitute a present
injury.).
82. See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 120-21 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(interpreting District of Columbia law); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 521-
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resulted in considerable confusion and a morass of conflict between
different jurisdictions.
B. Attempts to Minimize the ConjecturalNature of
All-or-Nothing Damages
1.

'.STANDARD OF PROOF

The imposition of a higher standard of proof upon the victim is
one apparent attempt to curb the speculation involved in increased
risk of future disease claims.8 3 The standard of proof is the degree of
belief concerning a fact that the party with the burden of proof must
establish in the mind of the factfinder or the court.8 4 The standard of
proof is relevant both to the issue of whether a party has satisfied the
burden of production8 5 and the issue of whether a party has satisfied
the burden of persuasion.8 6 In the usual situation in which the party
carries both the burden of production and persuasion, the production
burden is met by "the introduction of evidence which, viewed in the
aspect most favorable to the burdened party, is sufficient to enable the
trier of fact reasonably to find the existence of the particular element
of the claim for relief to be more probably true than not true."8 " In
the usual civil case, the persuasion burden is satisfied if the factfinder
believes that the existence of the disputed fact is more probably true
26 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986); Ayers v. Township of
Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 583-84, 525 A.2d 287, 300 (1987).
83. See, e.g., Rabb, 677 F. Supp. at 426 ("[I]n South Carolina [a recovery for prospective
consequences] may include only such future damages as 'reasonably certain will of necessity'
result in the future from the injury. . . . The 'reasonably certain' rule has been described as
one 'which manifestly and logically will reasonably come to pass, and not a mere possibility or
probability.' "); Stites, 660 F. Supp. at 1523-24 ("[A] reasonable certainty is more than a
reasonable probability, 'describes the highest degree of probability,' and 'has practically the
same meaning as 'in all likelihood.' "); Lavelle, 30 Ohio Misc. 2d at 14, 507 N.E.2d at 479
("[T]he injury complained of, and for which damages are sought ... must be shown with
A plaintiff can never prove causation
certainty, and not left to speculation or conjecture ...
of a disease which [has] not yet manifested itself.").
84. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1260, 178 (5th ed. 1979).
85. See, e.g., Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1158, 1160 (4th Cir.
1986) (interpreting Maryland law) (The district court properly excluded any evidence of the
pipefitter's risk of asbestos-related cancer because the proffered testimony failed to establish
that the future cancer was reisonably probable or reasonably certain.).
86. See, e.g., Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1137-38 (5th Cir.
1985) (interpreting Texas law) (Expert testimony that, in reasonable medical probability, an
insulation warehouseman had a greater than fifty-percent chance of contracting and dying
from an asbestos-related cancer was held sufficient to support the jury's award of damages in
an increased risk claim.).
87. M. GRAHAM,

(1988).
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than not true. 8 In the context of increased risk of future disease
claims, however, a number of courts seem to impose a hybrid standard of proof upon specific elements of the action. 9
Presently, most courts describe the appropriate standard of proof
for increased risk of future disease claims in terms of "reasonable certainty" or "reasonable probability": damages may be recovered for
future consequences only if those consequences are "reasonably certain" or "reasonably probable." 90 This standard is best understood as
requiring the victim to introduce evidence to demonstrate that the
future event will more likely than not occur-that
is, there is a greater
91
than fifty percent chance of occurrence.
The clarity of the reasonable certainty standard, however, has
been confounded by a confusing clutter of labels, such as "in all likeli88. Id. at 623.
89. See supra note 82.
90. See, e.g., Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1158, 1160 (4th Cir.
1986) (interpreting Maryland law) (reasonable probability); Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (interpreting District of Columbia law) (reasonably
certain); Larson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 427 Mich. 301, 317, 399 N.W.2d 1, 8 (1986)
(reasonable certainty); Mauro v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 225 N.J. Super. 196, 204,
542 A.2d 16, 20 (App. Div.) (reasonably probable), cert. granted, 113 N.J. 341, 550 A.2d 455
(1988); Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 102 A.D.2d 130, 136, 477 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (App.

Div. 1984) (reasonable certainty and reasonable probability).
91. Perhaps the clearest statement of the standard of proof required in an increased risk

claim was given in Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In
Wilson, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated:
The traditional American rule . .. is that recovery of damages based on future
consequences may be had only if such consequences are 'reasonably certain.' ...
To meet the 'reasonably certain' standard, courts have generally required
plaintiffs to prove that it is more likely than not (a greater than 50% chance) that
the projected consequence will occur. If such proof is made, the alleged future
effect may be treated as certain to happen and the injured party may be awarded
full compensation for it; if the proof does not establish a greater than 50%
chance, the injured party's award must be limited to damages for harm already
manifest.
Id. at 119 (footnotes omitted).
Wilson, however, is a case in which the court refused to apply the rule against splitting a
cause of action. Id. at 112. Six years before the suit was filed, doctors diagnosed the plaintiff
as having asbestosis resulting from his exposure to asbestos at work. Id. at 113. Wilson's
widow filed suit only when her husband died from malignant mesothelioma five years later.
Id. at 112-13. The court reversed summary judgment for the defendant asbestos manufacturers, holding that the plaintiff's earlier asbestosis did not bar his widow from splitting the cause
of action and simply seeking damages for the later cancer. Id. at 120-21.
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hood," 9 2 "reasonably probable, '9 3 "medically probable,"'9 4 "probable," 95 "more probable than not," 96 "a probability, '97 "more likely

than not,"9 "greater than fifty percent," 99 "reasonable medical cer92. See, e.g., Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1516, 1524
(W.D. Mich. 1987) (interpreting Michigan law) (Defendant manufacturer obtained summary
judgment when landowners exposed to TCE failed to introduce any evidence upon which a
reasonable jury could find that they would in all likelihood contract TCE-related cancer in the
future.).
93. See, e.g., Valori v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 82-2686, slip op. at 6-7 (D.N.J.
Dec. 11, 1985) (district court denied asbestos product manufacturer's motion to exclude from
trial any evidence of asbestos worker's increased risk of contracting cancer because proof that
the worker was a member of a class of workers, forty-three percent of whom would contract
cancer, satisfied the reasonable probability standard); Mauro v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas
Corp., 225 N.J. Super. 196, 199-205, 542 A.2d 16, 17-20 (App. Div.) (Asbestos worker's claim
for enhanced risk of cancer was correctly dismissed on the basis that the testimony of the
plaintiff's expert that there existed a high probability of increased risk and an unquantifiable
increased risk failed to demonstrate that the cancer was a reasonably probable prospective
consequence.), cert. granted, 113 N.J. 341, 550 A.2d 455 (1988).
94. See, e.g., Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 783 F.2d 589, 592 (5th Cir. 1986)
(interpreting Louisiana law) (testimony of increased risk of asbestos-associated cancer held
properly excluded, absent proof of a medical probability that plaintiff would develop cancer);
Pollock v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 686 F. Supp. 489, 489-92 (D.N.J. 1988) (interpreting
New Jersey law) (defendant manufacturer's motion to exclude the issue of increased risk of
cancer from trial granted on the ground that an asbestos worker's forty-three percent
statistical probability of contracting cancer in the future did not amount to proof of a medical
probability of occurrence).
95. See, e.g., Lorenc v. Chemirad Corp., 37 N.J. 56, 73-77, 179 A.2d 401, 410-11 (1962)
(doctor's award of damages for the risk of malignancy arising out of chemical burns upheld
because medical testimony of probable malignancy provided reasonable support for the jury's
verdict).
96. See, e.g., Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 533, 538-39 (5th Cir. 1984)
(interpreting Louisiana law) (Trial court did not commit error when it excluded evidence of an
insulation worker's increased risk of cancer resulting from asbestos exposure because the
insulation worker failed to introduce any evidence that his future medical expenses and future
loss of earning capacity would be more probable than not.), reh 'g denied, 783 F.2d 589 (5th
Cir. 1986).
97. See, e.g., McAdams v. Eli Lilly & Co., 638 F. Supp. 1173, 1174, 1174 n.78 (N.D. I11.
1986) (interpreting Illinois law) (daughter of a widow who ingested DES was not permitted to
present evidence at trial that women exposed to DES in utero are more likely to develop cancer
because the evidence did not establish a probability that she would contract cancer; however,
such evidence was admissible for the limited purpose of establishing a reasonablefear of cancer
accompanying her present physical injury).
98. See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119-20 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(interpreting District of Columbia law). In Wilson, the court permitted an asbestos worker to
split his cause of action, enabling him to sue asbestos manufacturers for losses arising out of an
asbestos-related cancer, despite the fact that he had earlier contracted asbestosis. Id. The
court reasoned that it would have been unfair to have required the insulation worker to have
sued for an increased risk of cancer at the time asbestosis manifested itself because he would
not have been able to produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the more likely than not
requirement under the "reasonably certain" standard. Id.
99. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 516 (5th Cir.)
(interpreting Mississippi law) (in a claim by a shipyard worker for damages for an increased
risk of asbestos-related cancer, the Fifth Circuit held that the occurrence of the future cancer
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tainty,' I°I or any combination of the above. 01 These labels are used
in an apparent attempt to shed light upon the degree of proof required
of the burdened party. The net effect of this profusion of language is

to leave one wondering whether the courts are discussing the same
standard or standards of subtly different degrees.
Compounding the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of the
reasonably certain or reasonably probable standard, a number of
courts seem to have created an equally uncertain heightened standard
of proof for the recovery of prospective losses. 102 These courts interpret reasonable certainty of future disease to mean that the victim
must produce evidence that the disease will occur "in all likelihood"
or with "the highest degree of probability."'0 3 Just what this means,
in evidentiary terms, is anybody's guess.
The problematic nature of this heightened standard of proof is

illustrated in Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc. 'o In Stites,
landowners ingested trichlorethylene (TCE) when the chemical
migrated into their drinking water from the site of a manufacturing
had to be shown to be " 'probable' (a greater than 50 percent chance)"), modified en banc, 750
F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1984), questions certified, 757 F.2d 614 (5th Cir.), cert. declined, 496 So.
2d 99 (Miss. 1985), aff'd en banc, 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
100. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1204-05 (6th Cir. 1988)
(interpreting Tennessee law) (the district court erred in holding that expert testimony of an
increased susceptibility to cancer and other diseases of 25-30% satisfied the reasonable medical
certainty standard).
101. See, e.g., Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1158, 1160 (4th Cir.
1986) (interpreting Maryland law). In Lohrmann, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that the district court properly excluded evidence of a risk of asbestosrelated cancer on the issue of damages because the evidence did not indicate that the
pipefitter's risk of cancer was "reasonably probable or reasonably certain." Id. at 1160. The
Fourth Circuit further stated: " 'Probability exists when there is more evidence in favor of a
proposition than against it (a greater than 50% chance that a future consequence will occur).
Mere possibility exists when the evidence is anything less.' " Id. (quoting Pierce v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 666, 464 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1983)).
102. See supra note 80.
103. See Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1516, 1524 (W.D. Mich.
1987). For further discussion of this case, see infra notes 103-14 and accompanying text. See
also Larson v. Johns-Manville Corp., 427 Mich. 301, 317, 399 N.W.2d 1, 8 (1986) (Court
allowed wrongful death actions although the victims had earlier discovered that they had
asbestosis because had they tried to prove a cancer risk claim back when they discovered their
asbestosis, they could not have met the standard that " 'only such future damages can be
recovered as the evidence makes reasonably certain will necessarily result from the injury
sustained'" (quoting King v. Neller, 228 Mich. 15, 22, 199 N.W. 674 (1924).); Lavelle v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 30 Ohio Misc. 2d 11, 13-14, 507 N.E.2d 476, 478-79 (C.P.
Cayahoga County 1987) (evidence of asbestosis-afflicted worker's increased risk of contracting
cancer held inadmissible because the injury and the damages resulting therefrom must be
proved with certainty, and evidence that pain, suffering, or a condition may result from an
existing injury is incompetent).
104. 660 F. Supp. 1516 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
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plant.'o 5 The landowners brought an action for their increased risk of
contracting cancer. 10 6 In response, the manufacturer moved for summary judgment and submitted detailed affidavits stating that TCE
could not be categorized as a human carcinogen and, alternatively,
that to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the residents were
exposed to an increased risk of only 0.186 percent. 07 In opposition,
the landowners introduced expert affidavits stating that TCE had
damaged the residents' immune systems and that, consequently, they
had a "greatly increased susceptibility to a number of future illnesses,
particularly cancer."' 1 8 The United States District Court for the
Western District of Michigan granted the manufacturer's motion for
summary judgment, declaring: "'in Michigan, in order to recover
damages on the basis of future consequences, it is necessary for a
plaintiff to demonstrate with 'reasonable certainty' that the future
consequences will occur.' "10o The court defined "reasonable certainty" as follows: "[A] reasonable certainty is more than a reasonable probability, 'describes the highest degree of probability,' and 'has
practically the same meaning as 'in all likelihood.' ,0

The Stites court's exposition of the standard of proof is distinctly
unhelpful. What proof, above a reasonable probability but below a
certainty, will satisfy this hybrid standard? The phrase "in all likelihood" seems to suggest a higher standard than "more likely than
not.""'I Given that very few increased risk claimants have been able
105. Id. at 1517.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1519-20. The defendant had scientific experts submit detailed affidavits. Id.
The affidavits explained how " 'one [could not] conclude to a reasonable degree of medical and
scientific certainty that TCE is a human carcinogen.' " Id. at 1519. They calculated that, even
assuming that TCE is a human carcinogen, one could not conclude, to a reasonable degree of
medical and scientific certainty, that TCE, at the maximum estimated exposure level of twelve
parts per million, presents a risk of cancer that could be classified as anything other than
extremely speculative and insignificant. Id. at 1519-20. Envisioning a worst-case scenario,
defense experts calculated that it was highly unlikely that any of the plaintiffs would get cancer
as a result of exposure to TCE-the maximum risk was 186 per 100,000 (0.186%). Id. at
1519. In addition, the affidavits detailed how one could not conclude, to a reasonable degree of
medical and scientific certainty, that TCE causes immune system injury. Id. at 1520. For the
meaning of 6to a reasonable degree of medical certainty," see infra notes 124-25 and
accompanying text.
108. Stites, 660 F. Supp. at 1521. The landowners' affidavits contained epidemiological data
supporting the proposition that TCE is a weak carcinogen, the Environmental Protection
Agency finding that TCE is a probable human carcinogen, and evidence that the amount of
TCE in the water supply exceeded regulatory standards. Id.
109. Id. at 1523.
l10. Id. at 1524 (quoting King v. Neller, 228 Mich. 15, 22, 199 N.W. 674, 676 (1924)).
S11f.
If a case similar to Stites were to go to trial and survive a motion for a directed verdict,
the judge probably would have to instruct the jury that, to find in the victim's favor, they must
find more probably true than not true the existence of elements such as breach of a legal
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to surmount the "more likely than not" hurdle,' 12 .the heightened
standard acts as a de facto guarantee that, in the context of present
scientific knowledge, no increased risk of disease claim will succeed.
Additionally, this heightened standard does not control speculation,
or from the wrongdoer's perspective, overdeterrence and overcompensation. 1 3 Assuming that the "in all likelihood" standard can be
interpreted as requiring a greater than seventy-five percent
probability, and assuming that any victim will assert his claim on the
basis of epidemiological studies,II 4 then, in theory, twenty-five percent
of all those victims who meet the seventy-five percent standard will
receive a windfall because they will; not contract the disease. The
impact of this windfall is to overdeter the wrongdoer." 5
In another apparent attempt to grapple with the speculative
nature of increased risk claims, some courts have expressed the standard of proof in terms of reasonable medical certainty" 16 or reasonable medical probability." 7 In Mauro v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
obligation, toxic exposure, and present physical injury. The judge, however, probably would
instruct the jury that, to find for the victim on the element of future cancer, they must find its
existence true in all likelihood. Thus it would seem that the court has imposed a "clear and
convincing" standard of proof for one element of damages in the increased risk claim. See E.
CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 959-60 (3d ed. 1984) (suggesting that the "clear and
convincing" standard of proof utilized in a limited number of civil cases means the jury must
be persuaded that the existence of the disputed fact is highly probable).
112. See supra note 63.
113. As to the damage caused to the tort system by overdeterrence and overcompensation,
see supra note 60.
114. The assumption that an increased risk of future disease claimant will rely on
epidemiological evidence reflects, in large part, what happens in reality due to our inchoate
understanding of the etiology of cancer. See McElveen, supra note 7, at 217-38 (discussing
judicial attitudes about the use of epidemiology to establish causation and the inherent
limitation of epidemiology, in that it cannot isolate the specific cause of a single individual's
injury); Rodricks, supra note 53 (discussing the type of evidence necessary to prove that
exposure to a toxic agent caused the victim's injury).
115. See Jose, supra note 59, at 92-93.
116. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1204 (6th Cir. 1988)
(interpreting Tennessee law) (In an increased risk of disease claim, "the predicted future
disease must be medically reasonably certain to follow from the existing present injury.").
117. See, e.g., Pollock v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 686 F. Supp. 489, 490 (D.N.J. 1988)
(interpreting New Jersey law) ("in order to recover damages for a prospective injury such as
the increased risk of developing cancer, plaintiff must establish proof of 'reasonable medical
probability' "); Mauro v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 225 N.J. Super. 196, 201, 205, 542
A.2d 16, 18, 20-21 (App. Div.) (A court may appropriately grant a defense motion for a
directed verdict on an increased risk claim if plaintiff's experts are "unable to quantify
plaintiff's enhanced risk of cancer and to predict, within a degree of reasonable probability,
that plaintiff will develop cancer."), cert. granted, 113 N.J. 341, 550 A.2d 455 (1988); Devlin v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 556, 559-60, 495 A.2d 495, 497 (Law Div. 1985) (The
standard of proof required to recover for prospective asbestos-related injury is proof to a
reasonable medical probability.).
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the plaintiff, a plumber and steam fitter who had performed

various jobs involving the asbestos-containing products manufactured
by the defendants, brought an action to recover damages for his present medical condition, his emotional distress, his enhanced risk of
cancer and his expenses in having to undergo future medical surveillance." 9 At the close of plaintiff's case, the trial court directed a verdict in the defendants' favor on the plaintiff's enhanced risk claim.' 20
On appeal, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New
Jersey upheld the directed verdict, declaring that the standard of
proof required to recover for prospective injury is proof to a reasonable medical probability. 1 The court determined that the plaintiff's
medical experts' inability to quantify the enhanced risk of cancer or to
give an opinion that, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the
plaintiff would develop cancer, was fatal to his enhanced risk claim. 22
The Mauro approach, however, has the potential for causing confusion since the standard of expert testimony "within a degree of reasonable probability"' 23 has a function separate from that of the
standard of proof. Properly understood, when expert testimony is
given to a "reasonable degree of medical or scientific certainty" or to
a "reasonable degree of medical or scientific probability," what is
meant, is that the opinion is in conformity with a substantially
accepted explanatory theory. 24 The "certainty" referred to is not certainty that a future condition will or will not exist. 25 On the other
hand, the standard of proof refers to the degree of certainty to which
evidence of a disputed fact must rise in order for the court or
118. 225 N.J. Super. 196, 542 A.2d 16 (App. Div.), cert. granted, 113 N.J. 341, 550 A.2d
455 (1988).
119. Id. at 199-201, 542 A.2d at 17-18.
120. Id. at 201, 542 A.2d at 18.
121. Id. at 204-05, 542 A.2d at 20.
122. Id. at 200-05, 542 A.2d at 18-21.

123. Id.
124. M. GRAHAM, supra note 86, at 261-62. The expert's opinion does not have to conform
to the only accepted explanatory theory; the probabilities expressed by the expert as his
opinion must simply be derived from a substantially accepted explanatory theory. Id. This
"standard of conformity" is most frequently analyzed within the framework of the rule of
evidence permitting expert testimony on matters of scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 702; see also Firestone, With Reasonable Medical

Certainty (Probability), 12

LEGAL ASPECTS MED. PRAC.

1, 1-4 (1984) (discussing how

"reasonable medical certainty" is a threshold for admissibility, distinguishing speculation from
competent opinion evidence, and suggesting physicians need to be informed that, if they
cannot form an opinion with sufficient certainty so as to make a medical judgment-as they do
in their everyday professional life-then they can provide nothing upon which a factfinder can
make a legal judgment).

125. Howard, Future Consequences of Injury: Satisfying the Rule Against Conjecture, 76
ILL. B.J. 666, 667 (1988).
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factfinder to treat it as true.126 Despite the confusing use of similar
terminology for each standard, "reasonable medical certainty" as an
evidentiary threshold for expert opinion is quite distinct from "rea27
sonable certainty" as a standard for proving the existence of a fact. 1
Some courts' habit of collapsing the two standards into one 128 only
serves to undermine the important function played by each.
Such conceptual confusion bedeviled the opinion of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Sterling v. Velsicol
Chemical Corp. 129 In a bench trial, the United States District Court
for the Western District of Tennessee found Velsicol liable for personal injuries arising after toxic agents, contained in the waste products of the production of chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides dumped
at a landfill, contaminated local well water.130 The Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court's award of compensatory damages, except
to the extent that the district court awarded damages for a twenty-five
to thirty-percent increased susceptibility to cancer and other diseases,13 ' and for immune system impairment and learning disorders. 1 32 On the issue of increased susceptibility to diseases, the Sixth
Circuit reversed the damages award on the ground that the district
court's factual finding of a twenty-five to thirty-percent risk, as a matter of law, could not satisfy the standard of proof that an anticipated
harm be a "reasonable medical certainty." 33 Regarding the award
for immune system impairment and learning disorders, the court
reversed the district court's judgment for the area residents because
their experts' testimony that the pesticide manufacturer's waste chemicals harmed the residents' immune systems and provoked a learning
disorder in one individual failed to conform to a generally accepted
3
explanatory scientific theory. ' 1
126. See text accompanying notes 84-88.
127. See generally Hullverson, Reasonable Degree of Medical Certainty: A Tort et a
Travers, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 577 (1987) (discussing how "reasonable medical certainty" defies
definition or analytical pigeon-holing and advocating a clean break with past semantical
confusion).
128. See supra notes 116-17.
129. 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
130. Id. at 1192, 1194. The court also awarded property damages and punitive damages.
Id. at 1194. Velsicol was held liable on theories of strict liability, common law negligence,
trespass and nuisance. Id.
131. Id. at 1205.
132. Id. at 1207-09.
133. Id. at 1205. The Sixth Circuit implied that it would have upheld the decision below
had the plaintiffs introduced expert testimony that the particular plaintiffs had a
"probability-i.e., more than a fifty percent chance--of developing cancer and kidney or liver
disease." Id.
134. Id. at 1209. The court explained that the theory of clinical ecology underpinning the
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The Sixth Circuit's analysis of the claims for increased risk and
immune system impairment illustrates the confusion engendered by
the use of the "reasonable medical certainty" standard. Under the
heading "proximate causation,"' 3 5 the court set out the applicable
rule of law in Tennessee: "To the extent that the plaintiffs seek damages for their bodily injuries, they must prove to a 'reasonable medical
certainty,' though they need not use that specific terminology, that
their ingestion of the contaminated water caused each of their particular injuries."'3 6 The court explained that the "reasonable medical certainty" standard embraces the witness' qualifications, the degree to
which his theories are accepted in the scientific community, and the
degree of certainty of his opinions.'3 7 Regarding the last factor, the
court stated that Tennessee law requires a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof: "[P]roof by a reasonable medical certainty
requires [the victim] only to establish that [his] particular injuries
more likely than not were caused by ingesting the contaminated water
,,38 The Tennessee courts had addressed these rules on numerous occasions. 39
. .

When the court applied the "reasonable medical certainty" standard to the increased risk claim, the reference to "certainty" in the
standard's label forced the court to stress that the "certainty" standard does not require that the evidence "conclusively establish with
absolute certainty that the future disease . . . will occur."'

4
0

The

court, however, could have avoided this muddle by resorting to plain
language. Properly understood, when an expert expresses an opinion
in terms of "reasonable medical certainty," he is simply asserting that
the opinion conforms to a substantially accepted explanatory theory.' 4' When the court addressed the issue of whether a factual finding of a twenty-five to thirty percent increased risk of disease could
testimony of the victims' experts specifically had been rejected as unscientific by the American
Academy of Allergy and Immunology and the California Medical Association. Id. at 1208.
Moreover, the victims' experts could not identify any studies of the effect of carbon
tetrachloride or chloroform on the immune system. Id. at 1208-09.
135. Id. at 1198.
136. Id. at 1200 (emphasis added) (citing Thompson v. Underwood, 407 F.2d 994 (6th Cir.
1969); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Young, 211 Tenn. 1, 362 S.W.2d 241 (1962)).

137. 855 F.2d at 1200.
138. Id. at 1201. A medical expert's opinion of causality between toxic exposure and injury
expressed as "a probability," "a likelihood," or "more likely than not" may satisfy the burdens

of production and proof, whereas an opinion voiced as "possible," "may have," "might have,"
or "could have" would not. Id.
139. Id. at 1200.
140. Id. at 1204.
141. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
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support an award of prospective damages, however, the court did not
discuss the acceptance within the scientific community of the theory
underpinning the expert testimony about disease risk.'42 Instead, the
court was concerned with the speculative nature of a disease with a
twenty-five to thirty percent chance of occurrence.' 43 The court could
have disposed of the increased risk claim by simply holding that,
viewing the increased risk evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, it was not sufficient to enable the factfinder reasonably to
find more probably true than not true the existence of the future
consequence. '

When the court discussed the claim for immune system impairment, it made no mention of the "reasonable medical certainty" standard. 45
' Yet the Sixth Circuit reversed the award for immune system
impairment precisely because it was based on expert testimony that
relied on a theory that has not become generally accepted within the
scientific community.' 46 The court applied a four-part test, under the
authority of Federal Rule of Evidence 702,147 to testimony by two
clinical ecologists that the pesticide manufacturer's waste chemicals
harmed the area residents' immune systems.' 48 The third element of
the test, namely that the testimony is in conformity with a generally
accepted explanatory theory, 149 serves precisely the function of the
"reasonable medical certainty" standard.' 50 As the court's robust
analysis of the testimony regarding immune system impairment indicates, '"' there is absolutely no need to clutter the analysis with such
Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1204-05.
Id. at 1205.
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1207-09.
Id. at 1209. Earlier in the opinion, the court had specifically stated that the
'reasonable medical certainty standard' .. . implicates ... the acceptance in the scientific
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

community of [the expert's] theories." Id. at 1200.
147. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto

in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702 if the party desiring to introduce the testi-

mony proves that the expert is "(1) a qualified expert (2) testifying on a proper subject (3)
which is in conformity to a generally accepted explanatory theory (4) the probative value of
which outweighs its prejudicial effect." Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1208 (citing United States v.
Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186, 1194 (6th Cir.), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2751 (1988); United States v.
Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir. 1977)).
148. Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1207-08.
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
151. Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1207-09.
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misleading term$ as '.reasonable medical certainty."' 52
As the law stands today, however, the standard of "reasonable
medical certainty" as an evidentiary threshold for expert opinion, and
"reasonable certainty" as a standard for proving the existence of a
fact, are interrelated in the area of increased risk of future disease
claims. This interrelationship was exemplified in Gideon v. JohnsManville Sales Corp. 113 In Gideon, an asbestos insulation worker
claimed damages for his enhanced risk of suffering cancer in the
future. 154 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
ruled that the appropriate standard of proof for recovery for prospective damages is that the future event be more likely to occur than
not. 5 The court also stated that since the future consequence in
issue was a potential medical disease, the future could only be
prophesied by "a qualified physician's opinion testimony based on
reasonable medical probability."' 156 The court then stated that testimony as to possibilities would not satisfy the standard of persuasion. 157 Consequently, if a victim pursues a claim for increased risk of
disease, he will require expert medical testimony in his favor anchored
upon the bedrock of reasonable medical probability.
In actions for increased risk of disease, courts have lacked consistency in their exposition of the standard of proof to which the future
consequences of a present injury must be proved. This failure stems
from the lack of careful analysis of the policy considerations underlying increased risk claims. The same flaw vitiates the courts' analysis
of the present injury component of the cause of action for increased
risk of disease.
2.

THE PRESENT INJURY REQUIREMENT

As an alternative to imposing a heightened standard of proof,
some courts attempt to control the conjectural nature of increased
risk claims by requiring the victim to demonstrate a narrowly defined
present injury. 15 8 In order to ensure that the victim's claim of future
injury is not purely speculative, the victim must demonstrate the
existence of a present injury' 59 because the "threat of future harm, not
152. See generally Hullverson, supra note 127.
153. 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985) (interpreting Texas law). For further discussion of this
case, see supra notes 34 & 47.
154. Id.at 1133.
155. Id.at 1137-38.
156. Id.at 1137.
157. Id.
158. See supra note 4.
159. See, e.g.,
Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 17-18 (D. Colo. 1984)
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yet realized, is not enough."' 160 The present harm serves as an anchor
for the future consequences. 16 ' Thus a broken kneecap provides the
necessary basis in fact to allow recovery for an increased risk of
62
degenerative arthritis. 1
Traditionally, the present injury requirement has been satisfied
by proof that the victim is suffering from a physical injury that is
symptom-producing. 163 Toxic exposure victims subject to increased
risk of insidious diseases have attempted to satisfy this requirement,
and its underlying purpose, by characterizing their increased risk as a
present, subclinical 164 injury, which over time may develop into the
full-blown disease. Most courts, however, have chosen to ignore
developments in modem science that enable the isolation of the indicia of insidious diseases. 165 These courts have rejected such a characterization of increased risk, insisting instead upon a symptomatic,
physical injury. 166 Such a rigid definition of present injury avoids
(interpreting Colorado law) (Individuals who lived adjacent to a uranium milling facility were
permitted to proceed with a claim for increased risk of cancer because allegations of
subcellular chromosomal damage caused by radiation exposure, at the very least, raised a
question of fact as to whether these individuals had sustained definite, present physical injury).
160. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, at 165.
161. See Kanner, Emerging Conceptions of Latent PersonalInjuries in Toxic Tort Litigation,
18 RUTGERS L.J. 343, 350-62 (1987) (arguing that the present injury requirement for increased
risk claims should be interpreted broadly to be consistent with advances in science).
162. Starlings v. Ski Roundtop Corp., 493 F. Supp. 507, 509-10 (M.D. Pa. 1980)
(interpreting Pennsylvania law).
163. Kanner describes the basic paradigm of an injury, as conceived by the courts, as "an
ordinary adverse impact that is either discrete and localized in a presently identifiable manner,
or which is symptom producing." Kanner, supra note 161, at 353.
164. As used in this Comment, "subclinical" refers to laboratory findings of anatomical
changes during the period in the evolution of a disease prior to the manifestation of symptoms
and is to be distinguished from "clinical," which denotes the symptoms and course of a
disease. STEDMAN'S, supra note 8, at 288, 1355.
165. Kanner states that "[m]odern medical science enables us to see 'risk' as present
chromosomal damage or immunological damage." Kanner, supra note 161, at 350.
166. See, e.g., Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir.)
(subclinical injury resulting from exposure to asbestos is insufficient to constitute the
identifiable, actual loss or damage to a victim's interests required to sustain a cause of action),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985); Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261, 269 (8th Cir. 1982) (claim
by children of an individual, who died of cancer after being exposed to low-level ionizing
radiation, for genetically transmitted cellular damage and exposure to an unusually high risk
of disease cannot support a lawsuit for present injuries), cert. denied sub nom. Laswell v.
Weinberger, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983); Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 156 Ariz. 375, 377-78, 752
P.2d 28, 30-31 (Ct. App. 1988) (The mere presence of asbestos fibers in the lungs, causing
changes in the lung tissue, is not sufficient to constitute the actual loss or damage required to
support a claim, by residents living adjacent to an asbestos mill, for increased risk of asbestosis
and cancer.); Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 76 I1. App. 3d 753, 761. 394 N.E.2d 1369, 1376
(App. Ct. 1979) (allegations of exposure to DES in utero and the existence of latent disease are
an insufficient basis upon which to recognize a present injury). But see. e.g., Barth v. Firestone
Tire and Rubber Co., 673 F. Supp. 1466, 1467-70 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (interpreting California
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speculation; however, it unfairly leaves many toxic exposure victims,
who have in no way contributed to their exposure, completely without
remedy.

3.

SPLIT CAUSE OF ACTION

Allowing a victim to split his cause of action is presently touted
by most courts as the best solution for the problems arising out of
lawsuits based on toxic exposure resulting in an increased risk of

insidious disease.' 67 Whenever the court decides to split the cause of
action, the victim is not permitted to pursue an increased risk claim if
and when the toxic exposure results in any harm. Rather, the victim
is forced to wait until an exposure-related insidious disease manifests
68
itself. Only when the disease strikes is the victim allowed to sue.'
Grounds often advanced for such an approach include avoidance of
speculation, fairness to the parties, evidentiary considerations regarding causation, and judicial economy. 6 9 Careful consideration of
law) (allegations of immune system damage and the presence of latent diseases in a complaint
seeking the creation of a medical monitoring fund to provide information, preventative medical
advice, and prompt medical care to tire workers exposed to industrial toxins constituted a
legally cognizable injury); McAdams v. Eli Lilly & Co., 638 F. Supp. 1173, 1174-75 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (interpreting Illinois law) (implicit in the court'sruling on the increased risk and fear of
cancer claims is the recognition that DES-induced abnormalities and deformities of the
reproductive system characterized as premalignant disease constitute present injury); Brafford
v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 17-18 (D. Colo. 1984) (interpreting Colorado law)
(allegations of subcellular chromosomal damage caused by radiation exposure, at the very
least, raised a question of fact as to whether the requirement of definite, present physical injury
was satisfied).
167. See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 120-21 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(interpreting District of Columbia law) (The District of Columbia Circuit held that it would be
unfair to require the decedent to have brought an action for future cancer at the time he
contracted asbestosis many years before he contracted cancer because of the substantial
difficulties of proof.); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 519-26 (Fla. 3d DCA
1985) (The court held that an asbestos worker presently suffering from asbestosis could not
recover damages for an enhanced risk of contracting cancer in the future, but allowed him to
bring an action in the future should he actually contract an asbestos-related cancer.), review
denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 584, 598-99,
525 A.2d 287, 300, 308 (1987) (The Supreme Court of New Jersey declined to recognize a
cause of action for an unquantified enhanced risk of disease, preferring instead to recognize an
action in the future once the disease manifests itself.).
168. See, e.g., Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1231-32 (D. Mass. 1986)
(interpreting Massachusetts law) (Residents' action for their increased risk of cancer and
leukemia resulting from consumption of contaminated groundwater would be delayed until the
illnesses manifest themselves, if such injuries resulted from disease processes different from the
diseases that the residents presently suffered.); Eagle-Picher, 481 So. 2d at 519-26 (an asbestos
worker's claim for a greater than fifty-percent risk of suffering future cancer was dismissed
subject to the right to relitigate should he actually contract the cancer later).
169. See, e.g., Wilson, 684 F.2d at 118-20 (discussing each of these grounds); Anderson, 628
F. Supp. at 1232 (discussing avoidance of speculation and fairness to the parties); Eagle-Picher,
481 So. 2d at 521-26 (discussing each of these grounds); Mauro v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas

INCREASED RISK OF FUTURE DISEASE

1989]

1115

these grounds, however, reveals that they are not so, clearly favorable
to claim-splitting.
Ayers v. Township of Jackson 170 contains the most open discussion of the policies favoring a split cause of action.' 7 1 In Ayers, toxic
pollutants leached into the local aquifer from a city landfill and contaminated adjacent property owners' well water.' 72 The property
owners brought a nuisance action and recovered damages for emotional distress, deterioration of their quality of life, and medical surveillance. ' 73 The property owners, however, appealed the trial court's
dismissal of their claim for damages for their increased risk of disease. 174 The expert for the property owners testified that they had an
increased risk of cancer due to exposure to toxic agents in their drinking water. 175 The expert could not quantify the extent of the
enhanced risk of cancer due to the lack of scientific information concerning the effect of the interaction of the various chemicals to which
the property owners were exposed.' 76 The Appellate Division of the
New Jersey Superior Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
increased risk claim 177 and the property owners petitioned the
Supreme Court of New Jersey for certification to review this
decision. 178
Having granted the petition for certification, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey viewed its task as one of balancing the policy considerations of recognizing a cause of action for unquantified increased risk
claims and recognizing a separate cause of action in the future, arising
if and when the disease manifested itself. 79 The court felt that, if it
recognized an action for an unquantified increased risk of disease, it
would expose the tort system to a flood of claims based on threats of
injuries that might never occur, 180 the courts would have to assess
damages for potential risks without any clear guidelines' 8 ' escalating
Corp., 225 N.J. Super. 196, 202-03, 542 A.2d 16, 19 (App. Div.) (discussing each of these
grounds), cert. granted, 113 N.J. 341, 550 A.2d 455 (1988).
170. 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987).
171. Id. at 583-84, 597-98, 525 A.2d at 300, 307-08.
172. Id. at 565, 525 A.2d at 291.

173. Id. at 565-66, 525 A.2d at 291.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 568, 525 A.2d at 292. The toxic agents to which the residents were exposed were

numerous. Id.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

588-89, 525 A.2d at 303.
566, 525 A.2d at 291.
567, 525 A.2d at 292.
597-98, 525 A.2d at 307-08.
597, 525 A.2d at 307,
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1 82
insurance rates would undoubtedly increase,
and such claims
18 3

would be difficult to manage and resolve.

On the other hand, the court recognized that a separate cause of
action, arising if and when the disease of which the property owners
84
were at risk actually occurred, was far from the perfect alternative.
Those people who subsequently contracted the disease might have
substantial difficulty in proving a causal relationship between toxic
exposure and their disease.' 85 Thus dismissal of the increased risk
claims would effectively preclude any recovery for injuries caused by
toxic exposure because it would be difficult to prove the injuries mani86
fested in the future were not the product of intervening events.'
Ultimately, the balance swung in favor of a split cause of action
because, under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, 187 upon which the
action was predicated, 8 8 the court was required to exercise constraint
in accepting novel causes of action against public entities.8 9
Although splitting the cause of action avoids speculation about a
victim's future injuries, it does so at a high cost. Once the insidious
disease appears many years after the toxic exposure, the victim may
be unable to find a solvent tortfeasor worth pursuing.' 90 Assuming
182. Id.
183. Id. at 597, 525 A.2d at 307.
184. Id. at 598, 525 A.2d at 308.

185. Id.
186. Id. For further discussion of the causation problem, see infra note 191 and
accompanying text.
187. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1 to 12-3 (West 1982).
188. Ayers, 106 N.J. at 565, 525 A.2d at 291.
189. Id. at 598, 525 A.2d at 308. Lower New Jersey courts and federal courts sitting in
New Jersey subsequently have split over the issue concerning whether the policy
considerations canvassed in Ayers apply to the context of private litigants and to claims for
quantified increased risks of disease that fall below a fifty-percent likelihood, so as to bar
recovery prior to contraction of the insidious disease. Compare Herber v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 81-82 (3d Cir. 1986) (increased risk of future disease claim dismissed
because plaintiff's expert did not have epidemiological data showing a class risk exceeding
fifty-percent and was not prepared to opine that plaintiff, more likely than not, would contract
cancer) and Pollock v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 686 F. Supp. 489, 489, 492 (D.N.J. 1988)
(present injury of pleural thickening and epidemiological studies demonstrating plaintiff had a
forty-three percent risk of contracting lung cancer failed to satisfy the reasonable probability
standard of proof and therefore was not a legally cognizable claim) with Valori v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., Civ. A. No. 82-2686, slip op. at 3-8 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 1985) (combining
present injury of asbestosis and scarred and thickened lungs and pleura with statistical
evidence of a forty-three percent risk of dying from lung cancer satisfied the reasonable
probability standard of proof) and Wolozen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 80-1413, slip
op. at 9 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 1988) (a quantified risk of future cancer of less than fifty percent
satisfied the requirements for a valid increased risk claim).
190. See generally Note, The Genesis of a New Trend: Chapter Il, A voiding or Managing
Future Liability in Mass Tort Actions?, 15 CAP. U.L. REV. 243 (1986) (describing a trend
whereby financially healthy companies facing speculative but potentially massive damages
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the victim finds a defendant still in business, he will still be faced with
the tremendous burden of proving that his insidious disease was
caused by the toxic agent to which he was exposed many years earlier.' 9' Moreover, a delayed action has no deterrent effect upon the
wrongdoer, since the individuals responsible for a toxic exposure are
unlikely to be held accountable. Thus an important goal of the tort
system is undermined. 192 Furthermore, the victim and society invariably will have incurred tremendous administrative costs in securing
93
legal relief for the immediate consequences of the toxic exposure.
awards for past tortious conduct manipulate Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 to
avert liability in mass tort actions).
191. In toxic exposure cases, the task of proving causation is aggravated by the extended
latency periods of the insidious diseases that the toxic agents may cause. A latency period of
ten, twenty or more years is not unusual. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 585,
525 A.2d 289, 301 (1987). Such periods of time cause enormous practical problems when a
victim attempts to gather evidence to prove his case. A further problem results from the fact

that there is a certain incidence of the same insidious diseases in parts of the general population
who have experienced no toxic exposure. Id. Years after a victim's exposure, it is difficult for
him to counter the argument that his injuries were the result of intervening causes. Id.; see,
e.g., Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984) (radio-active fallout produced by
the negligent conduct of open-air nuclear tests was held to have been a substantial factor in
causing various cancers in some area residents, but not in others), rev'd on other grounds, 816
F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987). One of the central issues in Allen was the certainty of the causal
relationship between the victims' exposure to nuclear fallout and their later cancers:
The great length of time involved. [with insidious diseases] . . . allows the
possible involvement of 'intervening causes,' sources of injury wholly apart from
the defendant's activities, which obscure the factual connection between the
plaintiff's injury and the defendant's purportedly wrongful conduct. The mere
passage of time is sufficient to raise doubts about 'cause' in the minds of a legal
system accustomed to far more immediate chains of events.
Id. at 406.
The causation problem is graphically illustrated by the litigation surrounding DES. See
Biebel, DES Litigation and the Problem of Causation, 51 INS. COUNS. J. 223, 226 (1984) ("The
DES litigants' special legal problems stem largely from the passage of time between the
mothers' ingestion of DES and the discovery of DES-associated abnormalities in their offspring."); see, e.g., Shields v. Eli Lilly & Co., 697 F. Supp. 12, 12-13, 15 (D.D.C. 1988) (interpreting District of Columbia law) (manufacturer of DES granted summary judgment because,
despite medical testimony that the plaintiff's injuries would not have appeared without exposure to DES "to a statistical certainty of 97% to 99.7%," the plaintiff could produce no evidence that DES had been prescribed to her mother).
192. The tort goals of deterrence and encouragement of socially responsible behavior work
best by encouraging employers to exercise more vigilant control over their servants, be it
stockholders over company managers or management over employees. See PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 27, at 13. Delaying a right of action until manifestation of an insidious
disease allows company management to take a calculated risk that the company will not be
held accountable for their corner-cutting practices, if at all, until well after it would harm
company profit margins and management careers. Tort law constitutes a residual system of
deterrence "by threatening imposition of liability on careless or unduly risky conduct that has
not been prevented by market incentives or regulatory controls." Spring 1988 Progress
Report, supra note 60, at 2-3.
193. Approximately sixty to seventy-five percent of the money expended by society to
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Such consequences include an acute injury, a reasonable fear of contracting cancer, and a medically recognized need for medical surveillance of the victim's condition. 9 4 Requiring the victim to bring
another action at some point in the future exposes him to yet more
administrative costs and the consequent reduction in his actual compensation. 95 Finally, splitting a cause of action does nothing to,promote finality between the victim and the wrongdoer; the efficiency of
the tort system as a dispute resolution mechanism is thus further
undermined. 196
resolve disputes concerning environmental harms and to compensate victims is absorbed as
administrative costs. Spring 1988 Progress Report, supra note 60, at 3, 13. These costs are
largely payments to lawyers. Id. at 3, 15.
194. One policy reason that is supposed to favor splitting a cause of action is judicial
economy. This reason was first articulated in Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d
111 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (interpreting District of Columbia law), which involved a claim by the
widow of an asbestos worker who died of malignant mesothelioma. Id. at 113. Years earlier,
the worker had been diagnosed as having asbestosis, and the asbestos manufacturers
unsuccessfully argued that the worker's claim for mesothelioma became barred at the same
time as his claim for asbestosis. Id. at 113-14, 120-21. The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia analyzed the judicial economy considerations as follows:
Upon diagnosis of an initial illness, such as asbestosis, the injured party may not
need or desire judicial relief. Other sources, such as workers' compensation or
private insurance, may provide adequate recompense for the initial ailment. If no
further disease ensues, the injured party would have no cause to litigate.
However, if such a person is told that another, more serious disease may manifest
itself later on, and that a remedy in court will be barred unless an anticipatory
action is filed currently, there will be a powerful incentive to go to court, for the
consequence of a wait-and-see approach to the commencement of litigation may
be too severe to risk.
Id. at 120.
The initial premise of this analysis does not take into account the judicial formulation of
such "anticipatory" actions as those for damages for reasonable fear of future disease and
medical surveillance costs; therefore, it is flawed. But see Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628
F. Supp. 1219, 1232 n.7 (D. Mass. 1986) (interpreting Massachusetts law) (although judicial
economy would not be advanced by splitting a cause of action, requiring the victim to combine
all possible claims in one action would create a precedent requiring other victims to rush to
court when they might not otherwise do so).
195. It is widely recognized that high administrative costs undermine the tort system's
efficacy as a compensation mechanism. See Spring 1988 Progress Report, supra note 60, at 3.
196. Society has an interest in resolving disputes between individuals fairly and promptly.
See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 27, at 15-16. Courts that allow a split cause of action
acknowledge that splitting does nothing to advance finality between the litigants. See, e.g.,
Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119 & n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (interpreting
District of Columbia law) (the wrongdoer has an interest in protecting himself against stale
claims and in planning for the future without the uncertainty inherent in potential liability,
otherwise he may not make the most productive and socially beneficial use of his resources);
Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 521 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (permitting the
victim to bring a separate action for cancer, if and when it occurs, does not promote finality),
review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986).
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REMEDYING INCREASED RISK CLAIMS BY- INSURING THE
RISKS TO WHICH TOXIC EXPOSURE VICTIMS
ARE SUBJECT

In order to control speculation, to avoid the difficulties of

monetarizing future physical injury, to maximize the deterrent effect
of tort law, to secure greater judicial efficiency, and to ensure definitive resolution of disputes, courts should recognize claims for significantly increased risk of future disease as claims upon which relief can
be granted. The relief, however, should be in the form of a court
order awarding the victim insurance coverage of the increased risks of
disease to which he has proved he is subject and directing the wrongdoer to pay the premium.' 97
A.

Increased Risk of Future Disease Claim Defined

Under the proposed increased risk cause of action, a victim of
toxic exposure should be able to obtain relief whenever he can prove
that he has a present injury that is capable of developing into a specific disease or diseases in the future, and that the specific future disease is reasonably probable to occur. 98 In this context, present injury
must be defined broadly-consistent with the development of medical
science-to encompass the indicia of insidious diseases that can be
verified by laboratory tests. 199 Reasonable probability of occurrence
must be defined to mean that, based on thoughtful analysis of the
medical and scientific evidence, there is a probability 20° that the dis197. Rosenberg was the first commentator to discuss the possibility of remedying mass
exposure cases with insurance funds, either in the form of a fund created and administered by
the wrongdoer or in the form of insurance purchased from private insurance companies.
Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 919-24. The private insurance remedy was subsequently
discussed in Note, Judicial Relief, supra note 43, at 648-52. Numerous courts and
commentators have called for legislated mechanisms of public insurance for toxic exposure
victims. See Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 598, 525 A.2d 287, 308 (1987);
Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 10, at 928-40; Trauberman, supra note 10, at 237-49; Pollution
Victim Compensation, supra note 10, at 612-16.
198. This definition takes into account the fact that we are all exposed to risks in everything
that we do. Thus, although there is a statistical risk that a guest in a car who cannot wear a
seat belt because the driver has not maintained it properly will be at increased risk of injury,
the guest has no claim against the driver because he can show no present injury. See Kanner,
supra note 161, at 356 (banning seat belts while increasing risk of injury for automobile
passengers does not necessarily create a demonstrable injury). Similarly, although there is a
statistical risk that a person exposed to benzene will develop cancer, a man who pumps gas
into his car will have no action for increased risk because he will be unable to produce
admissible evidence of subclinical injury.
199. See generally Kanner, supra note 161, at 353-56 (arguing that the concept of present
injury should be defined broadly to reflect advances in medical science).
200. Probability, as used here, means "the relative frequency with which an event occurs in
a specified class of elements." H. DENENBERG, R. EILERS, J. MELONE & A. ZELTEN, RISK
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ease will occur. 20 ' Both the requirements of present injury and reasonable probability of occurrence would have to be established by
expert testimony that conforms to a substantially accepted explanatory theory.2 °2
B.

Judicial Adoption of the Insurance Remedy

Courts cannot respond to advances in science and technology
simply by rigidly adhering to traditional doctrine. Courts must fashion remedies to meet rapidly changing needs. In the sphere of claims
for increased risk, courts are very concerned about the inherently
speculative and conjectural nature of an inquiry into an intangible
future loss that may never occur.20 3 In the area of toxic exposures,
the victim who is told that he has a quantified increased risk of contracting a particular disease could convert such an intangible loss into
a tangible loss by taking out insurance on the identified risk. 2° , The
AND INSURANCE 31 (2d ed. 1974). Probability would not cut off arbitrarily at a frequency
constituting "a greater than 50% chance," the definition of reasonable probability or certainty
adopted by most courts. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. Use of this definition
would result in the reversal of the outcome in a case such as Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp.,
855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988). The Sterling court held that a twenty-five to thirty percent
increased risk of disease failed to amount to proof of a "reasonable medical certainty" that the
disease would occur in the future. Id. at 1205. Under the proposed definition of reasonable
probability, a court could award insurance coverage to a victim subject to a twenty-five to
thirty percent increased risk of future disease because no arbitrary fifty percent cut-off point
would exist. Similarly, the outcome in Wolozen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 80-1413,
slip op. at 9 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 1988), which held that a quantified, less than fifty percent risk of
future cancer was sufficient to maintain an increased risk claim, would stand. The Wolozen
court equated the legal probability standard with the mathematical probability standard
proposed for the insurance remedy. Id.; see also Pollack v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 686 F.
Supp. 489, 490-91 (D.N.J. 1988).
201. At some point, an increased risk becomes so negligible that no relief should be granted.
For a discussion of the vexing problem of drawing the line between what is a compensable risk
and what is an uncompensable risk, see infra notes 227-34 and accompanying text.
202. If an expert is able to opine, in conformity with a substantially accepted explanatory
theory, that subclinical injuries to a victim indicate the presence of an insidious disease, then
courts should accept such subclinical injuries as legally cognizable present injuries. See, e.g.,
Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 17, 18 (D. Colo. 1984) (interpreting Colorado
law) (the victims produced experts of national renown who opined that the victims had a
present injury of chromosomal damage resulting from exposure to radiation). Once the victim
establishes such present injury, he must then adduce expert testimony, conforming to a
substantially accepted explanatory theory, that he is subject to a medically quantifiable
increased risk of contracting a specific disease in the future, in order to be entitled to the
insurance coverage remedy.
203. See supra notes 33, 44 & 69.
204. See Cooper, supra note 24, at 224. Rather than apply to an insurance company for
specific insurance of his disease risks, the toxic exposure victim, perhaps more realistically,
could purchase readily available lines of insurance, such as health care and disability policies,
and then claim a proportion of the premiums from the wrongdoer.
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insurance policy would provide the victim various benefits in the
event the possible future disease became a reality. The victim's tangible loss would be the insurance premium payments. The victim could
then bring an action to recover the cost of the premiums from the
wrongdoer. In order to justify his action in taking out the insurance
coverage, the victim might argue that the cost of the premiums was a
reasonable expense in attempting to minimize damages. 2 5 By construing the victim's purchase of insurance as a reasonable attempt to
avoid any further harm resulting from the wrongdoer's tortious conduct, the court could order the wrongdoer to pay damages amounting
to the cost of the premiums.
The closest analogy to such an approach is the courts' favorable
treatment of claims for medical surveillance costs.2" 6 Although courts
are adverse to compensating remote risks of serious harm, they are
nonetheless willing to compensate victims for the cost of periodic
medical checkups designed to detect and to prevent the remote risk of
serious harm. 0 7 Medical surveillance costs are considered a reasonable attempt to minimize damages as the early detection of diseases is
considered by the medical profession to be the best chance a person
has of curing a disease or preventing the disease's most severe consequences.2 0 8 Once the intangible risk of future disease is converted into
the tangible cost of reimbursement for medical monitoring expenses,
20 9
judicial fears of gross speculation and conjecture disappear.
205. Under the avoidable consequences rule, a victim "injured by the tort of another is not
entitled to recover damages for any harm that he could have avoided by the use of reasonable
effort or expenditure after the commission of the tort." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 918(1) (1977). Under this rule, it could be argued that any failure on the victim's part to
minimize his future losses would bar his recovery with respect to those future losses. There are
two difficulties with this approach. The avoidable consequences rule requires both an injury
and an avoidable harm. In the case of increased risk, injury would have to be interpreted
broadly to include subclinical changes in the body reflected in laboratory tests. Even with a
broadened interpretation of injury, however, the plain meaning of avoidable harm would not
seem to encompass a possible future disease. The purchase of an insurance policy that would
provide financial benefits upon the occurrence of the disease would not help to avoid the
disease itself. In response, the victim might argue that the insurance policy constitutes security
against the risk of astronomical future medical costs and provides for the cost of medical
monitoring for the early detection and therefore the possible cure of the future disease. Such a
policy, it. could'be argued, partially alleviates the victim's fear of future disease, thus further
minimizing future damage.
206. See supra note 5.
207. See, e.g., Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 599-607, 525 A.2d 287, 308-13
(1987) (claim for an increased risk of cancer based upon an unquantified risk of future harm
was rejected, but an award of $8,204,500.00 for medical monitoring costs, grounded on the
same unquantified increased risk, was upheld by the Supreme Court of New Jersey).
208. See id. at 603-04, 525 A.2d at 311.
209. See Cooper, supra note 24, at 224-25.
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An alternative approach to the problem of providing judicial
relief to the increased risk claimant would be for the court to exercise
its equitable powers to award the victim the right to obtain insurance
coverage of the risks of future disease to which he has been exposed
and to order the wrongdoer to pay the insurance premium for the
coverage. As against the wrongdoer, the relief would be coercive; the
wrongdoer would be commanded to make the periodic premium payments and would be subjected to punishment in the event of noncompliance.21 0 The hopeless inadequacy of damage awards, the
fundamental fairness of the insurance remedy, the unique nature of
the increased risk injury, and the balance of equities justify a court's
use of its coercive powers in this area.
An equitable remedy is an appropriate means of dealing with the
deficiencies of traditional rules at law.2 1 When an award of damages
is an inadequate remedy, equity provides an alternative form of
relief.212 The legal remedies available for increased risk claims have
210. Decrees in equity are in personam orders and coercive in nature. See D. DoBBs, supra
note 69, at 24-25.
211. In the opinion of one author, "substantive rules of equity were made in response either
to unduly rigid legal rules, or to their entire inadequacy, and in each case the substantive rules
were purportedly based on higher moral principle." Id. at 25.
212. Id. at 57. One equitable maxim appropriate here is that "equity does not suffer a
wrong to go without remedy." Id. at 44 n.24. Traditionally, however, equity refused to act if
there was a more or less workable legal remedy-"if the legal right was more or less fair, or if
practical alternatives were not shown." Id. at 33.
Courts are willing to use their equitable powers in the context of toxic exposure cases. In
Habitants Against Landfill Toxicants v. City of York, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,937 (May 20, 1985), the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas held that property owners
with wells located in proximity to a city landfill that had leaked hazardous chemicals had
sufficiently pleaded a cause of action in equity for the establishment of a constructive medical
trust fund to provide funds for the cost of medical monitoring and detection of future medical
problems. Id. at 20,937-38. The court determined that the property owners had satisfied their
burden of alleging the defendant landfill operators' and owners' duty in tort and breach thereof
by alleging:
[that] each defendant was involved in the ownership and operation of the landfill,
that toxic and hazardous waste was dumped at the site, that during the time
defendants were in control certain chemicals were allowed to leak into
surrounding properties, and this has created a hazardous health situation to all
plaintiffs.
Id. at 20,938. In addition, the court found that the future availability to plaintiffs of a ction
at law to recover medical expenses was an inadequate and incomplete remedy:
[The state environmental agency] has advised [plaintiffs] not to use their water
supply for human consumption because it has been contaminated by hazardous
substances emanating from the landfill. Furthermore, the actions of [state and
federal environmental agencies] show that the landfill has created a dangerous
and hazardous situation, the effects of which may be severe and latent injuries to
the plaintiffs.
Id.; see also Barth v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 673 F. Supp. 1466, 1476-78 (N.D. Cal.
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been shown to be unworkable and unfair.2 13 Increased risk claims
therefore are ideal for equitable relief. More importantly, however,
the proposed insurance remedy is a practical alternative.2 14
C.

Insurance Coverage

In the context of a successful increased risk of disease claim,
"insurance" would mean an agreement whereby an insurer would

agree to indemnify the victim if certain defined risks came to fruition;
in return for the provision of an offsetting benefit, the victim would be
transferring a potential loss to the insurer. 2' 5 The arrangement would
be structured to provide funds to offset the loss, so that in the event
the insurer has to pay, the insured is indemnified by a monetary
amount that restores him-as much as money ever can-to his position prior to the injury.2 1 6
Any insurance remedy would have to provide benefits equivalent
to the types of damages available in a successful personal injury lawsuit. 21 7 Provision would have to be made for the recovery of economic and noneconomic losses, including medical expenses, reduction
of earning capacity, loss of wages, and pain and suffering. 218 Because
1987) (interpreting California law). In Barth, a tire worker was held to have'stated *avalid
claim when he requested equitable relief in the form of a medical fund to pay for a program to
gather and distribute information on the diagnosis and treatment of diseases that may result
from exposure to toxins used in tire manufacturing and to pay for the early diagnosis of such
diseases. Id. The tire worker satisfied the court that he had no adequate remedy at law, that
he would suffer irreparable harm if the requested relief was not granted, and that he had
exhausted all effective legal remedies. Id.
213. See supra notes 44-196 and accompanying text.
214. The notion of practicality relates to the potential for enforcement problems to arise out
of a proposed decree. D. DOBBS, supra note 69, at 62. With the insurance remedy,
enforcement problems would be minimal. The insurer would draft the policy in accordance
with the findings of the court, subject to the court's ultimate approval. A contractually agreed
upon arbitration mechanism would resolve disputes as to coverage. Finally, the court could
use its contempt powers if for any reason the wrongdoer ceased to pay the premiums.
215. See R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW, A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 134-35 (student ed. 1988).

It has proved very difficult to expound a generally applicable definition of insurance. Id. at 35. Professors Keeton and Widiss define insurance as follows: "An insurance contract
generally involves an agreement by which one party (usually identified as an insurer) is
committed to do something which is of value for another party (usually identified as an insured
or beneficiary) upon the occurrence of some specified contingency." Id. at 2.
216. See id. at 134-35.
217. Three basic kinds of losses are recovered in'a successful personal injury action: time
losses, expenses incurred by reason of the injury, and pain and suffering. See D. DOBBS, supra
note 69, at 540. As personal injury damages awards are given in the form of lump sums, the
award typically includes an amount for both past losses within these categories and for such
losses in the future. Id.
218. The insurance remedy would differ from a typical personal injury award in that
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pain and suffering has no market value,219 the policy could provide for
schedules of pain and suffering for different types of diseases.22 °
An appropriate insurance policy remedy would narrowly define
the specific risks covered. 22 ' These covered risks would be limited to
those diseases-proven by the victim to the satisfaction of the jurythat place the victim at a significantly increased risk as a consequence
of his exposure to the wrongdoer's toxic agents.2 22 Only these possible diseases would be covered risks. The policy explicitly would
exclude fiom coverage any of the listed diseases that are shown to
have resulted from a cause distinct from the exposure to the toxic
agents.2 23
The insurance policy would also provide for the reimbursement
of medical monitoring expenses. Once the jury determined that the
need for medical monitoring had been proved, the court order could
specify the frequency, timing, and nature of the diagnostic tests that
the insurance policy would have to cover.2 24 This would then be
benefits would not be paid in one lump sum. The insured would receive reimbursement of his
losses as and when they arise. In the case of losses such as reduced earning capacity and pain
and suffering, the policy would have to address when to assess these losses. The policy could
appropriately provide for a lump sum award for reduced earning capacity and pain and
suffering.
219. See D. DOBBS, supra note 69, at 545.
220. One writer has included damage scheduling for pain and suffering within a proposal
for "Designated Compensable Event" coverage. Pollack, Medical Maloccurrence Insurance
(MMI): A First-Party, No-Fault Insurance Proposal For Resolving The Medical Malpractice
Controversy, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 552, 577 (1988). The advantage of scheduling pain and
suffering damages is that it takes into account the absence of a market for pain and suffering,
thus providing the insurer a degree of certainty regarding its likely liability within this area.
The predictability of likely losses plays an important function in the fixing of the policy
premium. See infra notes 235-38 and accompanying text. Additionally, scheduling minimizes
the administrative costs of assessing an appropriate level of compensation. The main difficulty
is that scheduling necessarily assumes that the same disease will produce the same amount of
pain and suffering in different victims. Of course, no two injuries are the same.
221. Insurance policies are generally categorized as either all-risk or specified-risk. R.
KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 215, at 462. The proposed insurance remedy would not
create a general health insurance policy-an all-risk coverage-but would provide coverage
only for the specific risks described in the policy.
222. See Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 920.
223. The disadvantage of a specified risk policy is that the definitions and restrictions are
likely to be a fertile area for dispute. One has only to consider the plight of uninsured motorist
coverage to realize the inherent risks. Like the proposed insurance remedy, uninsured
motorist coverage is a hybrid, first-party coverage of all the insured's potential losses if a
defined event occurs. Uninsured motorist coverage is predicated upon the driver at fault being
uninsured. The definition and restriction of uninsured motorist coverage has generated a
substantial volume of litigation. See R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 215, at 474. For a
discussion of the causation problems arising in the context of the proposed insurance remedy,
see infra notes 261-67 and accompanying text.
224. An alternative type of medical monitoring coverage would provide reimbursement for
all medical expenses that the victim's physician certifies as reasonably necessary for the early
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incorporated into the insurance policy, and the insurer would fix an
appropriate premium.
In addition, the insurance policy would include a provision for
arbitration
of disputes between the insured and the insurer over
the
whether a particular injury is a covered injury or the amount of benefits provided. Ideally, the arbitration panel should consist of medical
experts, since the most important question before it would be whether
the particular injury from which the victim is suffering falls within the
definition of the specifically covered disease.
Finally, the insurance policy would have to address whether or
not the insurer would be given a right of subrogation to the rights the
victim has against the wrongdoer. The better position is that the
insurer should have no such right. The context is different from the
normal situation in which a right of subrogation exists.2 25 Under the
insurance remedy, the wrongdoer is paying for the victim's insurance
coverage of future risks. In return, the victim is forfeiting any rights
he has to bring a future claim arising out of the toxic exposure. Consequently, any rights to which the insurer otherwise would have been
subrogated would be extinguished.
D. Difficulties Arising out of the Insurance Remedy
There are three significant problems with the adoption of the
insurance remedy. The first problem involves the difficulty of defining
what risks arising out of a toxic exposure should be compensable.
The second problem is that the cost of insuring against risks arising
out of toxic exposures may be prohibitively expensive. Finally, there
is the problem of establishing causation between the toxic exposure
and any disease that subsequently manifests itself. Each of these
problems overlap and contribute to the difficulty of the others.
1.

IDENTIFYING THE INCREASED RISK

An essential feature of the proposed increased risk claim is that
the victim must prove that his exposure to toxic agents has increased
his risk of suffering a specific future disease beyond the background
detection of the diseases specifically covered by the insurance policy. One risk of this type of
coverage is that the mere existence of insurance could give rise to a demand for services, which

would work to the advantage of over-cautious victims and unscrupulous physicians. The
approach suggested in this Comment provides the insurer greater certainty as to the amount of
its potential future payments and therefore improves the insurer's ability to determine an
accurate premium. On the other hand, the restriction on the frequency, timing, and nature of
the diagnostic procedures makes no allowance for the particular circumstances of each victim
and therefore may be criticized as unfair.
225. See R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 215, at 219-33.
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risk-the risk of that specific disease occurring in the general population. This begs the question: how much of an increased risk must the
victim demonstrate?
There is no easy answer to this question.22 6 The solution to the
problem must take into account three important public policies.
First, the remedy must mirror community values in an age in which
there exists a lack of knowledge about the health impact of modern
products and processes.2 27 Second, the court should not compensate
a plaintiff for a future risk that is supported by so little definitive proof
2 28
that any damage award would be based on pure speculation.
Finally, the judicial system must be shielded from a flood of spurious
claims.2 29 Undoubtedly, because of the present inchoate understand226. Trial courts that have awarded damages for unquantifiable increased risks of disease
(usually only to be reversed on appeal) are silent about what constitutes the minimum
compensable increased risk. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 32122, 473-74 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (trial court held that an increased susceptibility to disease of at
least twenty-five to thirty percent was a compensable element of damages, but paid no
attention to how far that decision opened the door to potential compensation for much lower
risk levels or what the measure of damages would be for such risk levels), reversed, 855 F.2d
1188 (6th Cir. 1988). But see, e.g., Siegel & Salvesen, Sterling v. Velsicol: The Casefor a New
Increased Risk Rule, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,155, 10,161 (May 1987) (in
discussing the district court opinion in Sterling, the authors recommend a cause of action for
increased risk of disease subject to proportional recovery, but with a cutoff point, set at what is
reasonable in the light of each case, below which the level of increased risk would not be
compensable).
227. See Elliott, supra note 58, at 785-90. Rather than focusing on an appropriate increased
risk standard, Elliott discusses how toxic-tort litigation is primarily concerned with the
redefinition of public morality for an era in which society must face up to its incomplete
understanding of the relationships between private inventions and public health. Id. at 781-82.
228. The scourge of rampant speculation and conjecture has been the motivating force
behind all of the judicial restrictions placed upon the action for increased risk. Even those
courts most sympathetic to victims exposed to increased risks of disease recognize the need to
place a cap on the opportunities for speculation. In Valori v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., Civ.
A. No. 82-2686, slip op. at 3-8 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 1985), the district court denied the asbestos
manufacturers' motion to exclude evidence of a shipyard worker's increased risk of sustaining
an asbestos-related cancer, although the worker's proof merely showed that he was a member
of an occupational group exposed to a certain level of asbestos of whom forty-three percent
would suffer lung cancer. Id. The court stated that the precise quantification of the risk of
lung cancer satisfied the purpose underpinning the reasonable probability standard: "to
maintain ... the jury's central role in assessing future damages, while culling out only those
case [sic] in which the plaintiff is able to produce so little definitive proof to support his claims
of future harm that any damage award would necessarily be based on vague speculation." Id.
at 7.
229. See, e.g., Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir.) (If the
mere existence of a subclinical injury triggered a cause of action for personal injuries under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, the federal courts would be inundated with anticipatory
claims by healthy railroad workers.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985); Wilson v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (If an individual is diagnosed with a
minor toxic exposure injury for which he does not require a judicial remedy, but is also told
that he is at risk of sustaining a more serious injury and he may be statute-barred from filing an
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ing of toxic chemicals and insidious diseases, wherever the courts
draw the line between compensable and noncompensable, exposurerelated risks, someone will suffer an injustice.230
Given the nature of an insurance remedy, the line should be
drawn at the point where expert medical testimony, given in conformity with a substantially accepted explanatory theory, cannot quantify
as a reasonable probability the increased risk to which the victim has
been exposed.23' In those cases in which the state of scientific art is
such that the toxic exposure victim cannot quantify his increased risk,
the court sfiould apply the next-best remedy, namely the right to pursue an action in the future should the risked disease occur and scientific knowledge and methodology improve. This compromise takes
into account the unlimited potential for unfairness and overdeterrence, which would arise if the court granted an insurance remedy, or
for that matter a proportional damages remedy, to an individual subject to an increased but wholly unquantifiable risk of future disease.232
The success of the proposed remedy depends on the extent to
which society can develop reliable scientific estimations of health
risks. One exceptional context is asbestos. Over the years since the
carcinogenic nature of asbestos was first identified, a remarkable
quantity of medical information has been generated concerning the
risks of disease connected with varying degrees of exposure to friable
action if and when that injury manifests itself, he will have a powerful incentive to file an
anticipatory action.); see also Siegel & Salvesen, supra note 226, at 10,161 (emphasizing the
need to find a mechanism to weed out spurious increased risk suits once one abandons the
requirement that the victim prove that his future disease has a greater than fifty-percent
chance of occurring).
230. See supra note 229. In the absence of a cutoff point, the allowance of all increased risk
claims effectively would create a hypochondriac's charter under which the wrongdoer virtually
becomes the victim's health insurer.
231. Use of this test would reverse DePass v. United States, 721 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1983)
(interpreting Illinois law). In DePass, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit upheld the district court's denial of damages for increased risk of cardiovascular
disease and loss of life expectancy. to an individual who had suffered a traumatic amputation of
his leg. Id. at 203-06. Substantially uncontradicted, the plaintiff's expert cardiovascular
epidemiologist testified that, based. on a National Institutes of Health study, the plaintiff had a
forty-four to. fifty-eight percent higher than normal risk of dying from heart disease and a
consequent thirty percent reduction in life expectancy. Id. at 208-09 (Posner, J., dissenting).
Under the proposed remedy, insurance coverage for cardiovascular disease would remedy the
plaintiff's increased risk. Providing a remedy for the risk of heart disease would address the
problem of systematic underdeterrence raised by Judge Posner in his criticism of the DePass
majority opinion. Id. at 208, 210 (Posner, J., dissenting).
232. Insurance works best with predictable probabilities and not unpredictable
probabilities. See infra notes 235-38 and accompanying text. Although an insurer could draft
a policy covering an unquantifiable risk of disease, the large financial cushion the insurer
would have to build into the premiums would have an overly adverse effect on the wrongdoer's
business. "
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asbestos. Asbestos has been associated with a number of so-called
signature diseases-rare diseases that can be reliably related to exposure to a particular chemical simply because they have virtually no
other known causes.
Other chemicals are more problematic in that they have not been
studied in sufficient detail or for a sufficient period of time to enable
scientists to assess just what kind of diseases and, a fortiori, what
quantum of risk these chemicals pose. Even when there exists scientific information about the health effects of particular toxic agents, the
emphasis the proposed remedy places upon quantification' of the risk
may present an incentive for plaintiffs' attorneys to employ experts
who will distort the available evidence in order to present evidence of
a quantified increased risk of disease to the court.
In the context of claims for fear of future disease and for medical
surveillance costs,233 the courts use the flexible concept of reasonableness to distinguish the legitimate claims from the others. 234 Regardless of which test is used, careful application of the present injury and
reasonable probability requirements should control any increase in
the amount of litigation caused by recognition of the proposed
remedy.

2.

PRICING THE PREMIUM

Professor Kenneth Abraham wrote: "[I]nsurance deals best with
risk, or predictable probabilities, and not with uncertainty, or unpredictable probability of loss. ' ' 23S Although it is true that almost any
risk is insurable,2 36 an effective insurance remedy mandates a price
that ensures full compensation to the victim, is fair to the wrongdoer
and effects optimal deterrence of the wrongdoer's conduct. These
goals are difficult to achieve because of the unpredictability of the risk
created by the incomplete scientific understanding of the toxic exposure-future disease equation.
233. See supra note 5.
234. See id. Nonetheless, there have still been some absurd results. See, e.g., Clark v.
United States, 660 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. Wash. 1987) (interpreting Washington law) (victims
of exposure to TCE recovered damages for their emotional distress, although there was no
actual risk of cancer greater than one excess death in one million, over a seventy-year lifetime
of consumption), aff'd without opinion, 856 F.2d 1433, 1434 (9th Cir. 1988).
235. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
942, 946 (1988) [hereinafter Abraham, Limits of Insurance]; see also K. ABRAHAM,
DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 59 (1986)
("Insurers are risk spreaders not risk speculators.") [hereinafter K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING
RISK].

236. See R.

KEETON

& A.

WIDISS,

supra note 215, at 128.
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An insurance company calculates a premium by evaluating the
cost of a number of factors with respect to the type of risk to be
insured. In the context of toxic exposure-related insidious diseases,
the most significant factor the insurer must estimate is the total cost
of meeting the losses that might result from the occurrence of the
insured diseases, which the insurer has grouped into a pool of risks.
This total cost is then reduced by the value of those cases in which the
insurer calculates that the insured diseases will not come to fruition. 237 Additional factors include the size of a reserve fund in the
event the total risk-in this case the predicted occurrence of insidious
diseases within the pool-is underestimated, the insurer's administrative costs of establishing and processing insurance coverage of insidious disease risks, the expenses of doing business, such as marketing
this line of insurance, and the insurer's profit margin.2 38 The most
difficult task facing an insurer providing lines of coverage to victims of
toxic exposures is predicting the total cost of the benefits it will likely
have to pay out.
The difficulty of predicting the incidence of future disease in a
given group of people who have been exposed to toxic agents has
already reared its head in the broader context of environmental liability insurance. There is a limited coincidence of problems shared by
these two types of coverage. Environmental liability insurance
addresses a collection of risks that are of greater variety than the risks
addressed by the proposed insurance remedy. Insurance of environmental liability involves the risk that the operation of a venture using
hazardous materials will damage natural resources, result in property
damage, or cause personal injury or disease. 239 At present, the environmental liability insurance market is in crisis; coverage is either
unavailable or only available in return for astronomical premiums.2 4 °
One cause of the crisis in environmental liability coverage is the
existence of insurance that was not priced in careful correlation to a
potential insured's expected losses. The existence of poorly priced
insurance enables a potential wrongdoer to externalize risks of liability through the purchase of insurance and consequently results in the
reduction of the potential wrongdoer's loss-prevention incentives.24 1
237. Id. at 11-12.
238. Id. at 12.
239. See Abraham, Limits ofInsurance, supra note 235, at 942 n.l.
240. Id. at 943-44. Severe and fundamental problems bedevil the insurance market for
environmental liability coverage at a time when the market for other types of liability
insurance has stabilized. Id.
241. K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note 235, at 17. Potential liability for

environmentally caused diseases whose etiology and effects are incompletely understood
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Only when science is in a position to predict what forms of exposure
to what kinds of chemicals will cause what kinds of disease, will insurers be able accurately to price insurance against toxic tort liability and
therefore achieve something approaching optimal deterrence. Such
deterrence requires that the potential wrongdoer internalize the cost
of premiums that are more attuned to the environmental risks of a
particular venture.

The availability of an insurance remedy for toxic exposures ultimately may depend on whether the ability exists to predict potential

costs, thus enabling insurers to set premiums at a level that will not
expose them to potentially vast liability. Some problems in predicting
potential liability in the area of toxic exposure insurance appear in the
context of environmental liability coverage. First, the number and
severity of injuries, which will be associated with new chemicals, cannot be predicted until experience accumulates.24 2 Second, the primitive nature of scientific knowledge concerning the hazardous
properties of toxic agents adds varying degrees of speculation to risk
assessment.2 4 3 Third, the very primitive understanding of the synergism of chemicals that have been mixed together during storage 24in
waste dumps enhances the degree of speculation about the risk.
probably leads to defendants purchasing more insurance, which because of the paucity of
accurate data about expected losses and the prohibitive administrative expenses of applying
available data, does not achieve optimal deterrence of the defendants' behavior. Id.
242. See id. at 46-47 (discussing how the lack of scientific knowledge about, the ability of
new chemicals to injure people aggravates the insurance actuary's task of predicting the
potential cost of furnishing insurance for possible environmental liabilities). Due to the ability
of toxic agents to result in insidious diseases that do not manifest themselves until many years
later, a useful level of experience regarding the effects of a chemical may not accumulate for
many years. Id. at 47. Victims, on the other hand, will sue for the acute consequences of toxic
exposure shortly after that exposure. One of the posited advantages of the proposed insurance
remedy is that the insured will be able to resolve all of his claims arising out of the toxic
exposure in one action. In the context of exposures to new chemicals, however, this is an
illusory advantage because sufficient information as to the increased risk of disease posed by
such chemicals is unlikely to be available at the time the victim sues to recover damages for his
acute injuries and his fear of cancer. See Humphreys, An Application of Risk. Pesticides in
Toxic Tort Litigation, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 696, 700 (Nov. 18, 1987). Indeed, even
delaying such a claim until manifestation of the injury most likely will not fill the information
gap concerning the effects of the chemicals. Such circumstances present a compelling basis for
the creation of statutory no-fault victim compensation schemes. Up to now, however,
legislatures have ignored calls for such schemes. See supra note 197.
243. K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note 235, at 47.
244. Id. Lack of knowledge about the synergistic effects of chemicals that become mixed
together was one of the problems faced by the plaintiffs' medical experts in Ayers v. Township
of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 588-89, 525 A.2d 287, 303 (1987). In Ayers, a variety of toxic
chemicals had been dumped at a city landfill. Id. at 565, 525 A.2d at 291. Local residents
were exposed to these chemicals when they leached through the ground and into the well
water supply. Id. The Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the dismissal of the residents'
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Finally, the effect of economic inflation-during the latency of the
covered disease-upon the future cost of the benefits that the insurer
will eventually have to pay for, is largely unknown. 245 The essence of
the problem is that the insurer suffers from the same quantitative
information gap about the hazards of toxic chemicals as the potential
victim, the potential wrongdoer, the courts, the medical experts, and
2 46
the government.
Although the proposed insurance remedy shares some of the
pricing problems found in the sphere of environmental liability insurance, there are significant differences that, while increasing the unpredictability of assessing potential environmental liabilities, do not have
a parallel effect upon the risks the proposed remedy will address.
claim for increased risk of cancer and other diseases on the ground that a significantly
enhanced but unquantified risk of future disease was too speculative to give rise to a cause of
action under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. Id. at 598-99, 525 A.2d at 308. Plaintiffs'
medical experts opined that the significantly enhanced risk of disease was unquantifiable
because of limited knowledge about the synergistic effects of the chemicals to which the
residents had been exposed. Id. at 588-89, 525 A.2d at 303.
The synergism of chemicals also causes difficult problems when the victim is exposed to
chemicals from two different sources, and those chemicals act synergistically to produce a
greater injury than each chemical would have caused on its own. For example, cases involving
a smoker who claims damages for future injuries arising out of exposure to asbestos fibers are
frequently litigated. See, e.g., Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1138-39
(5th Cir. 1985) (holding testimony about smoking admissible because it "related directly to the
extent of damage caused by the inhalation of asbestos fibers.").
245. K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note 235, at 47. Because insidious diseases
can undergo extended periods of latency, an insurer underwriting toxic exposure cases will
have to build a margin of error into the price of the insurance policy to take into account the
potential changes in economic conditions over the years. An additional consequence of such
extended latency periods is that the insurer will not know for a long time whether the
company's predictions of potential future claims are economically sound. Id. at 47. Given the
long period of time that may elapse before any claims are brought, it may be too late to avoid
suffering a large loss by adjusting premiums and actuarial data. One counterbalancing
advantage, from the insurer's perspective, of potentially lengthy latency periods is that the
delay between payment of premiums and the provision of any insurance benefits allows the
insurer greater time to maximize the income by investing the amounts received as premium
payments.
The dilemma of adequately funding a benefit that may not be paid until far into the future
is equally problematic in the sphere of long-term care risk insurance. See Bell, Financingthe
Long-term Care Risk, XLII J. AM. Soc'y C.L.U. & C.H.F.C. 72 (1988). The prevalence of
functional. impairment among the elderly is a relatively new phenomenon and health care
insurers lack actuarially sound data for evaluating the long-term care risk. Id. at 73. The
challenge to insurance markets presented by potential diseases arising out of toxic exposure is
similar to the challenge presented by long-term care risks: "to provide actuarially sound
[insurance] at affordable prices covering a risk that has both a high probability of occurring
and a high potential severity in terms of cost." Id.
246. In the area of environmental liability, insurance companies are in no better position
than anyone else to evaluate risks and thus to price premiums because of the acute lack of
quantitative information about the dangers of toxic chemicals. See K. ABRAHAM,
DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note 235, at 48.
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Consequently, the insurability of the specific risks arising out of toxic
exposure will be that much greater than the insurability of the risks of
environmental liability arising out of the operation of a given venture.
One of the greatest unknowns in environmental liability insurance is
the tremendous unpredictability of changes in the legal doctrines supporting greater liability or recovery. 24 7 Because the proposed insurance remedy will only be triggered when the liability of the wrongdoer
has been established, the dynamics of the proposed remedy will not
depend on the relative stability of a limited number of mercurial legal
doctrines. As such, it is a much more predictable and thus insurable
risk.
Another unknown in the realm of environmental liability insurance not shared by the proposed insurance remedy is the unpredictability arising out of the fact that "toxic tort disasters tend to be
catastrophic in scope and sporadic in occurrence. '24 8 The problem of
risk assessment in the area of the proposed insurance remedy presents
a much narrower predictability problem: the court already will have
made a determination of the wrongdoer's liability to a defined group
of victims and of the disease-risks to which they have been exposed.
The court, moreover, will spell out the categories of benefits any
insurance will have to cover. At a minimum, the potential insurer
will be able to calculate the maximum potential losses that might arise
from the coverage because, unlike environmental liability coverage,
the identity of the maximum number of individuals entitled to policy
benefits is known in advance.
The final area of unpredictability of environmental liability insurance relates to the determination, based on the most up-to-date scientific information, of when, how, and to what extent any of the insured
risks will come to fruition. Calculating the frequency of risk realization will be less uncertain in the context of the proposed remedy than
247. Id. at 46-49. Such "legal inflation"-changes in doctrine supporting greater liability
and recovery-is very damaging to the process of calculating the costs of insurance. Id. One
effect of the unpredictability of environmental liability has been the demise of "occurrence
policies" and the increased use of "claims-made" policies. Id. at 49-51, 58-59. See generally
R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 215, at 598-99 (discussing the reasons for and the
consequences of the shift to claims-made policies in the areas of professional liability and
comprehensive general liability policies). Insurers have shifted away from policies predicated
upon the occurrence of an event within a specified time period, with no limitation with regard
to when losses are sustained. K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note 235, at 50.
Instead, insurers offer coverage limited to actual claims made during the policy period. Id.
The advantage of the claims-made policy is that the insurer only needs to predict the extent of
its insured's exposure to claims that will be made during the defined policy period, thus
avoiding the prediction of long-term claim exposure. Id.
248. K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note 235, at 47.
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in the context of environmental liability insurance because the
insurer, in the former context, will have available considerable information concerning the degree and type of exposure, the identities of
the toxic agents involved, and the personal circumstances and characteristics of the insureds z4 9
Of course, there are factors unique to the insurance of toxic risks
that are not reflected in other areas of insurance and that are likely to
impact adversely the cost of the proposed insurance remedy. The
most significant of these factors, in terms of the potentially devastating effect on the price of premiums, is the limited ability of the insurer
to distribute the risks of loss associated with the proposed remedy.
Risk distribution is an approach utilized by insurers to achieve risk
management.2 ° When there is uncertainty as to whether a particular
insured will suffer a loss covered by the insurance policy, the insurer
can control the impact of the uncertainty by pooling or combining
similar types of risks of loss into one group. 2 " As the number of
pooled ventures increases, the relative dispersion of potential outcomes lessens; stated differently, "there is a greater likelihood that the
2 2
favorable and the harmful experiences will tend to be balanced.
Although risk distribution does not improve the insurer's ability to
predict whether any insured will sustain a covered loss-indeed it
increases the insurer's absolute risk-spreading the risk over a great
number of similar ventures tends to assimilate the potential dispersion
of outcomes to the actuarially-calculated average.253
The insurance of the identified risks arising out of a toxic exposure, however, presents little opportunity for risk distribution. Effective risk pooling depends on identifying large numbers of individuals
who participate in similar activities and therefore who are subject to
similar risks.254 The weakness of the court-ordered insurance remedy
249. The insurer could access the court record to obtain information relevant to the
assessment of the risks it was contemplating insuring.
250. See generally R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 215, § 1.3 (discussing the concepts

of risk and risk management underpinning insurance transactions).
251. Id. at 12.
252. Id. at 12-13. The classic example of this phenomenon is flipping a coin: "the
percentage of heads and tails in the flipping of a coin tend to stay more nearly in balance as the

number of tosses of the coin increases." Id, at 13 n. 11.
253. See id. at 12-13.

254. K.

ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK,

supra note 235, at 62. Although numerous cases

regarding toxic exposure have been brought in recent years, the number of people exposed to
toxic agents and the consequent increase in the risk of sustaining an insidious disease is a mere
drop in the ocean. Thus the potential market is nothing like, for example, the relatively
untapped market for long-term disability or catastrophic illness insurance. See Bell, supra note
245, at 72 ("Approximately 20 percent of the nation's elderly have chronic illnesses, and 40
percent will enter a nursing home sometime during their life.") Insurers will be forced to
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is that the identification of similarly situated individuals subject to

similar risks depends on prior court adjudications of the degree of
risk, and more importantly, on the liability of the wrongdoer. Caseby-case adjudication of an individual's enhanced risk claim is hardly
conducive to the speedy establishment of large risk groups.2"' The
size of any particular class of similarly situated toxic exposure victims, across which an insurer could distribute the risk of loss, would
depend on the number of lawsuits adjudicated by the court or settled
by the parties.256 In the event that the insurer may not be able to
distribute the risks it is assuming across a sufficiently large pool of
insureds, the insurer may be able to secure the appropriate degree of
risk distribution by reinsuring part or all of the risk with another
insurer.257 Another factor that is likely to increase the price of the
insurance remedy is the customized coverage required for an individual victim's risks; customization means incurring the additional
administrative expense of individualizing the transaction.25 8 Custom-

charge higher premiums because of the limited scope for risk pooling in the area of toxic
exposures.
255. The insurance remedy would function most effectively in class actions filed
immediately upon discovery of mass exposure. See Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 920. See
generally Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective
Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987) (demonstrating how mass tort class actions achieve the tort
goals of compensation and deterrence more effectively than case-by-case adjudication).
256. Class actions, however, do improve the insurer's ability to pool the risks arising in
toxic exposure cases. The facts of Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir.
1988), are a good illustration. In Sterling, a total of 103 local residents brought tort actions
against Velsicol, the owner of a waste burial site, to recover compensatory and punitive
damages. Id. at 1193-94. The local residents alleged that they had sustained injuries after
drinking water drawn from wells that, unknown to them, had become contaminated with
carbon tetrachloride and chloroform from Velsicol's waste burial site. Id. The district court
consolidated the cases by certifying a class action pursuant to Rule 23 (b) (3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 1194. The class action then proceeded to trial with five
representative plaintiffs. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed awards of
damages for the five plaintiffs' increased risks of future diseases on the ground that "an
increased risk for susceptibility to cancer and other diseases of only twenty-five to thirty
percent . . . does not constitute a reasonable medical certainty." Id. at 1205.
From the perspective of the proposed insurance remedy and the opportunity for risk
distribution, an insurance company is likely to be much more willing to insure a pool of 103
individuals with risks of disease ranging from twenty-five to thirty percent than the case in
which one individual seeks insurance for his twenty-five to thirty percent risk. If the insurance
company insures the latter risk, it likely would add a considerable amount to the premium to
compensate for the wide dispersion of possible outcomes, which raises questions about the
fairness of charging the wrongdoer for this uncertainty.
257. The reinsurance market allows an insurer to attain an appropriate degree of risk
distribution by transferring part of the risk undertaken to another insurer or group of insurers.
See R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 215, at 13.
258. See generally R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 215, at 118-20 (outlining the
advantages of standardized insurance policies).
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ized coverage will be necessary because different victims will be at risk
of developing different diseases and different victims will be at risk of
incurring different income loss. The specific risk policy will cover
only those diseases to which the court has determined the victim is at
risk. Moreover, if the insurance remedy is to provide benefits
equivalent to the types of damages available in a personal injury
action, then the policy will have to cover the individual victim's
potential loss of income.
Other factors unique to the toxic risks addressed by the insurance remedy effectively will increase the price of coverage. Because
payable benefits will have to be equivalent to the damages available in
a personal injury suit, the insurance coverage will have to reflect the
principle that the victim must be placed as nearly as possible in the
position he would have been in had the injury not occurred. 25 9 As a
result, the insurer cannot incorporate into the policy a limitation of
the maximum amount payable. The insurer necessarily will have to
make provision in the size of the premium for this potential openended liability.26° Ultimately, the justification for requiring the
wrongdoer to pay the premium, whatever it costs, is society's interest
in deterring people from exposing others to toxic agents.
3.

ESTABLISHING CAUSATION

Any insurance remedy will have to address the question of causation. Once the victim is granted insurance coverage for identified
risks, it must be determined when the insurance company must pay.
Stated differently, the issue becomes: may an insurance company
refuse to pay benefits to a victim, who develops a disease listed within
the terms of the policy, on the grounds that the particular disease was
not caused by the prior toxic exposure? This problem might arise in
several contexts. The insurer could challenge a victim's entitlement
to benefits on the basis that the victim's disease falls within the normal background incidence of that disease,26' that the disease resulted
259. D. DOBBS, supra note 69, at 540.
260. Even uninsured motorist coverage contains a financial limit on liability. See R.
KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 215, at 406; Insurance Services Office, Personal Auto Policy
(Ed. 1985) at 5, reprinted in R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 215, at 1121, 1125.
Uninsured motorist coverage is first-party insurance, under which the insurer contracts to pay
the insured the damages he would have been legally entitled to recover from another motorist,
but for the latter's lack of insurance. R. KEETON & A. WiDiss, supra note 215, at 399.
261. See, e.g., Humphreys, supra note 242, at 696 (Even for those pesticides whose toxicity
characteristics or mode of use made them relatively detectable after application, proving
causation is very difficult because "immediate symptoms suffered by plaintiffs alleging pesticide
injuries often mimic those common in the general population.").
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from an intervening event, such as another toxic exposure, or that the
disease has concurrent causes, one or more of which is not related to
the prior toxic exposure.26 2
Precisely because these causation problems are virtually insolu2 63
ble,
the insurance remedy must provide a mechanism for addressing them in a manner that will not provoke vexatious litigation and
wasteful costs. The insurance policy would have to provide that, once
the victim demonstrates, by medical evidence, that he has one of the
specific diseases listed in the policy, a presumption of coverage would
arise. 2 64 In addition, the policy could require that an arbitration
panel of medical experts resolve any disputes as to whether the victim
is suffering from a covered disease and therefore entitled to benefits.
The insurer would have the burden of proving that the victim's disease was caused by an event other than the toxic exposure; thus any
doubt as to causation would be resolved in favor of coverage. Of
course, the insurer will charge a higher premium, and the wrongdoer
will carry the extra financial burden. The advancement of the tort
goal of deterrence, however, justifies the imposition of this additional
burden upon the wrongdoer.
E. Advantages of Insuring Risks of Future Disease
The objectives of the tort system are to compensate fully victims'
262. Both cigarette smoking and exposure to asbestos fibers have been associated with lung

cancer. See

EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC RISKS TO HUMANS,

supra note 58, at 107, 359.

Consequently, the parties to asbestos litigation hotly dispute the cause of the victim's cancer.
See, e.g., Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1139 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding
that the jury must decide whether the insulation warehouseman's increased risk of cancer was
caused by smoking, asbestos exposure, or both).
263. Courts have adopted a variety of mechanisms to sidestep intolerable causation
problems. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 689 F. Supp. 1250, 125758 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). Under the settlement distribution plan arising out of the litigation
surrounding the exposure of Vietnam veterans to dioxin-contaminated herbicides, to qualify
for benefits a veteran must show: (1) service in an area where agent orange was used, (2)
disability as defined by the Social Security Act, and (3) injuries that are not accidental,
traumatic or self-inflicted. Id. The qualificatory requirements specifically do not address
causation, thus minimizing administrative costs. Id.
264. The success of insuring specific listed diseases will stand or fall on how well the insured
event can be defined. Administrative compensation schemes for product and process injuries
share the difficulty of defining the compensable event in a manner that avoids causation
problems. See Abraham, The Insurance Implications of Administrative Compensation
Schemes, 25 Hous. L. REV. 817, 818-21 (1988). A general definition of the compensable event
will raise the cost of the remedy. Id. at 818-19. On the other hand, a narrow definition of the
compensable event will create difficult borderline areas of dispute. Id. at 819. In addition, "it
is difficult to define a compensable event before one becomes aware of the existence of a set of
injuries or diseases that might be included." Id. at 820.
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injuries and to deter efficiently wrongdoers' tortious activities.2 65 In
the context of torts arising out of toxic exposures, the system can only
attempt to approximate this goal because of our limited scientific
understanding of the relationships between contact with a chemical
and the subsequent manifestation of an insidious disease such as cancer. The development of an insurance remedy for increased risks of
future disease constitutes the best approach, available today, to
achieving the tort system's objectives, by combining the best features
of the court system with some of the best features of the administrative process. 2 6 6 The insurance remedy has numerous advantages over
the alternatives presently posited by the courts,2 67 including, but not
limited to, more just determination of compensation, more efficient
deterrence, and reduced costs.
First, instead of compensating the victim of a toxic exposure for
the chance of a future disease, the proposed remedy establishes a collection of insurance benefits for those victims who can prove that they
have been exposed to a quantifiable increased risk of disease. Nobody
receives a windfall. Only those toxic exposure victims who cannot
prove any quantified increased risk of disease because of the state of
current scientific art remain uncompensated. The wrongdoer cannot
complain about the proposed insurance remedy. Although the
wrongdoer undoubtedly will be paying for insurance coverage for
some individuals who are exposed to toxic agents, but who do not
manifest any subsequent injury, the assault to the exposure victim's
dignity occasioned by the wrongdoer's tortious actions in exposing the
victim to a potential carcinogen justifies such a burden.
Second, the wrongdoer's immediate liability for the premium
would advance the tort goal of deterrence,2 61 without overdeterrence,
because only those victims who eventually developed the insidious
diseases would recover under the policy. As such the proposed insur265. See supra note 35.
266. One of the themes running through Professor E. Donald Elliott's analysis of increased
risk claims and hybrid compensation schemes is that future debate on the issue of how best to
deal with hazardous waste in the environment should concentrate on developing institutional
arrangements that combine the best features of the courts and the administrative process.
Elliott, supra note 58, at 783.
267. See supra notes 44-196 and accompanying text.
268. See R. POSNER, LAW AND EcONOMICS 190 (2d ed. 1986) (the basic function of law, in
an economic perspective, is to alter incentives); Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents,
84 YALE L.J. 656, 656 (1975) (examining the meaning of "the fault system" and "strict
liability" in the context of the "goal of minimizing accident and accident prevention costs").
See also Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 919-20 ("failure of the courts to establish the defendant's
liability to all risk victims would, for a variety of reasons, substantially frustrate the system's
deterrence and compensation objectives.").

1138

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1081

ance remedy would eliminate over- and undercompensation far more
effectively than any remedies currently provided by the judicial
system.
Third, the private insurance remedy would lead to substantial
savings in judicial resources. It would eliminate the large costs
involved in the process of attempting to determine and to distribute
compensation for risks of future disease.26 9 Insurance companies initially would bear the distribution costs, but would pass them on to the
wrongdoer by charging a higher premium. These distribution costs
would be limited to the expense of awarding compensation to the proportion of toxic exposure victims who actually contracted the identified disease.2 7 ° Other savings in judicial resources would arise from
courts not having to furnish a number of victims two opportunities to
sue the wrongdoer: one for the acute injuries provoked by the toxic
exposure and a second for the subsequently manifested insidious diseases arising out of the exposure. The doctrine of res judicata would
preclude a victim who brings an action for increased risk of disease
from subsequently instituting an action upon the manifestation of
latent injuries.
Fourth, the private insurance remedy would address productivity
problems concerning the application of statutes of limitation and the
single cause of action rule. Liability could attach as soon as medical
experts were able to quantify the risk as something above de minimis,
thus utilizing the freshest, most available evidence of tortious conduct
and causation.2 7'
Fifth, the private insurance remedy would encompass the costs
of medical surveillance for the early detection of insidious diseases.27 2
At present, when a court concludes that medical monitoring is justified, it invariably orders the establishment of a court-administered
fund.2 7 Shifting the responsibility for administering medical monitoring funds from the courts to private insurance schemes would
relieve the courts of this obligation and thus result in a substantial
saving of judicial resources.
Finally, because insurance provides the psychological benefit of
reassuring toxic exposure victims that they have coverage against cat269. See Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 922.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 923.
272. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 156 Ariz. 375, 381, 752 P.2d 28, 34 (Ct. App.
1988); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 608, 525 A.2d 287, 314 (1987).
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astrophic future illness,2 74 the court could instruct the jury to take
this factor into account when calculating an award for fear of future
disease. Because the victim who is able to prove a quantified
increased risk of future disease would recover under the insurance
remedy, the jury would no longer face the temptation to take into
account the victim's exposure to a risk of future illness in calculating
damages for fear of disease. The net result would be a reduction in
the size of recovery for fear of disease claims.
V.

CONCLUSION

Current tort doctrine does not permit recovery for a quantifiable
increased risk of future disease if the disease cannot be stated to be
more likely than not to occur. The essential reason for this is that
judicial remedies are still hidebound by tort doctrines that were formulated long before scientific advances nudged the legal system
toward the field of toxic torts and the analysis of insidious disease
causation. Once courts recognize that they do not have to address
this problem using the traditional all-or-nothing damages approach,
they should be more receptive to countenancing claims for quantifiable increased risk of future disease. Using their equitable powers,
courts may grant an award of limited insurance coverage to the toxic
exposure victim. With one sweep, the courts will, have begun to
address problems of valuation, over- and undercompensation, and
fairness to the parties, without doing violence to the purposes of tort
law.
DAVID

274. See Note, Judicial Relief, supra note 43, at 650.
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